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ENHANCING SECURITY IN THE FUTURE CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
by
KEBINA MANANDHAR
Under the Direction of Xiaojun Cao, PhD
ABSTRACT
Cyber Physical System (CPS) is a system where cyber and physical components work
in a complex co-ordination to provide better performance. By exploiting the communication
infrastructure among the sensors, actuators, and control systems, attackers may compromise
the security of a CPS. In this dissertation, security measures for different types of attacks/
faults in two CPSs, water supply system (WSS) and smart grid system, are presented. In
this context, I also present my study on energy management in Smart Grid.
The techniques for detecting attacks/faults in both WSS and Smart grid system adopt
Kalman Filter (KF) and χ2 detector. The χ2-detector can detect myriad of system fault-
s/attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS) attack, short term and long term random attacks.
However, the study shows that the χ2-detector is unable to detect the intelligent False Data
Injection attack (FDI). To overcome this limitation, I present a Euclidean detector for smart
grid which can effectively detect such injection attacks. Along with detecting attack/faults I
also present the isolation of the attacked/faulty nodes for smart grid. For isolation the Gen-
eralized Observer Scheme (GOS) implementing Kalman Filter is used. As GOS is effective in
isolating attacks/faults on a single sensor, it is unable to isolate simultaneous attacks/faults
on multiple sensors. To address this issue, an Iterative Observer Scheme (IOS) is presented
which is able to detect attack on multiple sensors.
Since network is an integral part of the future CPSs, I also present a scheme for pre-
serving privacy in the future Internet architecture, namely MobilityFirst architecture. The
proposed scheme, called Anonymity in MobilityFirst (AMF), utilizes the three-tiered ap-
proach to effectively exploit the inherent properties of MF Network such as Globally Unique
Flat Identifier (GUID) and Global Name Resolution Service (GNRS) to provide anonymity
to the users. While employing new proposed schemes in exchanging of keys between different
tiers of routers to alleviate trust issues, the proposed scheme uses multiple routers in each
tier to avoid collaboration amongst the routers in the three tiers to expose the end users.
INDEXWORDS: Smart Grid, Water Supply System, Kalman Filter, False Data Injection
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1PART 1
INTRODUCTION
A Cyber Physical System (CPS) tightly combines and co-ordinates its computational/-
cyber elements together with physical elements [1, 2]. In many CPSs, sensors are deployed to
enable the communication between cyber and physical elements by converting the informa-
tion gathered from the physical world to cyber data. For example, the authors of [3] designed
the CPS employing sensor techniques to monitor the algae growth in Lake Tai, China. Their
design comprises of sensors and actuators to monitor the order of severity of the algae bloom
and to dispatch salvaging boats. Similarly, the authors of [4] proposed a CPS approach that
navigates users in locations with potential danger, which takes advantage of the interaction
between users and sensors to ensure timely safety of the users.
Along with the growth of interest in CPS, the security aspects of the system have also
attracted significant attention. Recent attacks on cyber physical systems, such as STUXNET
[5] and the malicious attack on the sewage system in Queensland, Australia (2000) by an
ex-employee, further highlights the vulnerability of such systems and emphasizes the need to
study as well as understand the security aspects of a CPS. Besides pure cyber attacks as in
the case of STUXNET, sensors are equally prone to attacks and manipulations. Attacks on
sensor readings allow attackers to mask the actual attack performed on the CPS, causing the
attack to remain undetected. Thus, it is important to detect attacks/faults and isolate the
attacked/faulty nodes in a timely manner. This dissertation focuses on the security aspects
of two cyber physical systems: Smart Grid system and Water supply system.
With the advent of new technologies, the secluded power grid system is being replaced
by grid, which is a typical smart CPS having more embedded intelligence and networking
capability. Power grid is an important infrastructural backbone having a deep impact on
economy as well as our daily activities. Failures in power grid often lead to catastrophic
2effects as the ones in New York (2003) and Mumbai (2012). Though both of these failures
resulted due to the faults in the system, security failures can also result in similar conse-
quences, if not worse. In smart grid systems, cyber and physical components work in a
complex co-ordination to provide better performance and stability. Sensors are equipped
throughout the system to monitor various aspects of the grid such as the meter and voltage
fluctuations in these systems. The collected information from the sensor networks help in
providing feedback to the physical power grid devices. Hence, such a CPS involves a two-
way communication between the controller system and the physical components as shown in
Figure 1.1. This provides user with many new functionalities but at the same time it also
provides attackers with more attack possibilities.
Figure (1.1) Block diagram for a smart grid system
In the following chapters, I present a security framework for smart grid using Kalman
Filter (KF) and χ2-detector. Since the χ2-detector can not detect the statistically derived
False Data Injection (FDI) attack, an additional detection technique using the Euclidean
distance metric is also presented. A mathematical model is derived together with KF to
detect possible attacks and faults on the smart grid system. The performance of the ex-
3ploratory method, χ2-detector, in identifying faults and random attacks is studied and the
limitation of χ2-detector in detecting the statistically derived False Data Injection attack is
explored. I also present a new Euclidean detector to be coupled with KF and demonstrate the
effectiveness of these approaches via extensive simulations and analysis on practical systems.
Along with detection, the isolation of attacked/faulty nodes in the system is also equally
important. For attack isolation, I implement the Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) based
on Kalman Filter and χ2-detector. GOS is effective in detecting attack on a single sensor.
However, it fails to detect attacks/faults on multiple sensors at a given time. To address
this issue I present a new Iterative Observer Scheme (IOS) to identify the sensors that are
being arbitrarily attacked or are at fault in smart grids. The comparison between GOS
and IOS shows IOS can effectively identify the attacks/faults on multiple sensors. Further,
GOS employs m observers to identify a single misbehaving sensor in constant time. Com-
pared to that, IOS uses the same amount of observers to detect all misbehaving nodes in
approximately O(logαm).
Similarly, Water supply system (WSS) is another sensitive area which can have dramatic
public health and economical impacts when attacked. Water supply system deploys sensors
and actuators to monitor water level and water velocity at a certain location and time. In this
dissertation, I present a framework for attacks and faults detection in a water supply system
by applying the Saint-Venant equations and Kalman Filter techniques. The Kalman Filter
generates estimates for state variables using the mathematical model for the WSS and the
data obtained from the sensor network deployed to monitor the WSS. A χ2-detector is then
employed to detect the discrepancies between the estimated data and the measured data,
and trigger alarms. The χ2-detector can effectively detect attacks like the DoS attack and
random attack. FDI attack is also investigated on the sensors and elaborate corresponding
defending approaches are discussed.
As discussed earlier network is an integral part of the future CPSs. With more and
more static as well as mobile devices being connected to the network and with requirement
for complex security protocols, it is no longer clear that the networking requirement for
4the emerging and future technologies can be satisfied by making incremental changes in the
current networking architecture. Hence, different possible future network architectures are
being studied, for example Nebula [6], MobilityFirst [7]. Furthermore, in order to have a
secure CPS it is crucial to have a secure networking system. Therefore, in this dissertation
anonymity and security for the future internet architecture specifically for the MobilityFirst
network is also studied.
With increasing number of smart devices attached to the network, keeping track of
energy consumption and fluctuation becomes important as they enable the generation of
energy signatures to track malicious activities. In this context, I also present our study on
scheduling of electrical appliances based on their energy consumption patterns, in a building.
This dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 1 I discuss Kalman Filter. In
Chapter 4 a security framework for smart grid using kalman filter and χ2-detector is pre-
sented. Further, I show that χ2-detector is unable to detect FDI attack and then present
Euclidean detector that is able to detect FDI attack. In Chapter 5 two attack isolation
schemes for smart grid are presented. These schemes are called GOS and IOS, and use filter
banks that are based on KF. Chapter 7 further extends this framework to be used with
WSS. In this chapter, I derive a mathematical model for WSS and implement KF to obtain
the security framework. In Chapter 8 I present a scheme called Anonymity in MobilityFirst
(AMF), which preserves user anonymity and provides security by implementing encryption
and clever exchange of key for the MobilityFirst future internet architecture. In chapter 6
I present linear programming based load scheduling for energy management in smart grid.
Finally I conclude in Chapter 9 with my findings.
5PART 2
CYBER PHYSICAL SYSTEM
The term cyber physical system (CPS) refers to a new generation of intelligent systems
with integrated computational and physical capabilities that allows interaction between com-
putational and physical components [8]. In CPS the computational components (embedded
computers and networks) monitor and control the physical processes. These processes are
usually provided with feedback loops that provide feedback to the computational compo-
nents [9]. The feedbacks help the computational components to monitor and control the
physical processes.
While some form of CPSs are already in use [3][4], newer types of CPSs are emerging
in many different areas. These areas range from autonomous vehicles and traffic systems
to critical infrastructures like electric power distribution, oil and natural gas, water and
waste-water distribution systems [10]. The disruption of these critical systems could have a
significant health, safety and economic impact.
2.1 Security in Cyber Physical System
The tight integration between computational and physical systems introduces new se-
curity concerns in CPS. As stated in [11], the existing security approaches are either inap-
plicable, not viable, insufficiently scalable, incompatible, or simply inadequate to address
the challenges posed by highly complex environments in a CPS. Since the CPS system are
more complex and involves more devices than the traditional networks, attacks different from
traditional cyber attacks that are unique to such systems are possible in CPS for example
resonance attacks [12]. In such an attack, the compromised sensors or controllers force the
physical system to oscillate at its resonant frequency. Data injection attacks are another
class of attacks that are possible in CPS [13][14], in which the attackers compromise a set
6of sensors and provide false data to the central system. These attacks are crafted to bypass
the detectors and cause the system state to change which may cause the system to act in an
unpredicted manner.
Similar to the traditional networks, the security goals for CPS include integrity, avail-
ability and confidentiality but their definition need to be adjusted for CPS [12]. Integrity
refers to the trustworthiness of the data and refers to being able to prevent, detect and
survive data integrity attacks in CPS. Availability refers to the ability of the system to be
accessible and usable upon demand. The attack on availability such as DoS attack might
have more severe impact on CPS since it also involves operation of time sensitive physical
system. Confidentiality in CPS could refer to either user privacy in commercial CPS appli-
cation or preventing adversary from eavesdropping on the communication channels between
the sensors and the controller, and between the controller and the actuator [12].
2.2 Challenges in CPS security
Information security for traditional networking systems has developed mature technolo-
gies that can be used to prevent, detect and respond to attacks against control systems.
However, the state-of-the-art research in computer security does not consider how attacks
affect the estimation and control algorithms and ultimately, how attacks affect the physical
world [12]. Moreover, most of the effort for protecting control systems focus on reliability
i.e. fault detection and are wide open to malicious cyber attacks.
Much study in literature focus on the security of data communication from the physical
components to the central controller or among different elements (e.g., sensors and actuators).
For example, the authors in [15] propose an intrusion detection system to detect malicious
nodes in the smart grid wireless network. Similarly, a distributed intrusion detection system
is discussed in [16]. Recently, many emerging attacks specifically targeting communication
and control systems in smart grid are exposed [15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. Similarly, deception and
denial of service attacks against a networked control system are defined in [20]. Deception
attacks compromise the integrity of either the control packets or measurements tampering the
7sensors and actuators. DoS attacks compromise the availability of resources, for example by
jamming the communication channel rendering the CPS unable to function properly. A more
direct approach would be to tamper the physically unguarded monitoring sensors leading to
the generation of false data. A general strategy to identify physical tampering is to deploy an
estimator and a detector in the controller. The estimator compares the calculated estimates
with the actual readings and verifies them [13],[14]. The detector triggers an alarm when
the estimated states and measured states do not agree with each other. In other words, a
significant difference between the estimated and measured states signifies either a fault or
a possible attack on the system. However, the studies in [13],[14] show that a new type
of attack called False Data Injection attack can be directed at the system if some system
parameters are known to the attacker.
In this dissertation, I study security for two CPSs: smart grid and water supply system.
For each of these CPSs the existing literature is discussed in depth at the beginning of each
chapter. In addition to this, I also study security and privacy in MobilityFirst future internet
architecture considering the importance of networking infrastructure in the CPSs.
8PART 3
KALMAN FILTER
Since majority of our techniques discussed in this dissertation are based on Kalman
Filter, we disucss Kalman Filter in this chapter. Kalman Filter is used to estimate the
values of state variables of a dynamic system that is excited by stochastic disturbances and
stochastic measurement noise. The Kalman filter is a set of mathematical equations that
provides an efficient mechanism to estimate the state of a process such that the mean of the
squared error is minimized [21]. The filter supports estimations of past, present and future
states.
3.1 Principles of KF
The Kalman Filter [22, 21, 23] technique is used to obtain estimates for the state space
vector xt. Kalman Filter assumes the state at time t is evolved from the state at time t− 1
according to the equation below.
xt = Axt−1 + But−1 + wt−1 (3.1)
where, A is the state transition model applied to the previous state xt−1, B is the control
input model applied to the control vector ut and wt is the process noise which is independent
of the initial conditions. The observation equation for Kalman Filter can be written as:
yt = Ctxt + vt (3.2)
Here, yt is the measurement vector, Ct is the observation model that maps state space
into the observed space and vt is the measurement noise which is independent of the initial
conditions and process noise. Both wt and vt are assumed to be white Gaussian noise with
9zero mean and standard deviation σ.
Kalman Filter can then be applied to compute state estimations xˆt. Let the mean and
covariance of the estimates be defined as follows:
xˆt|t = E[xt, y0, ...., yt]
xˆt|t−1 = E[xt, yt, ...., yt−1]
ρt|t−1 = Σt|t−1
ρt|t = Σt|t−1 (3.3)
Here, xˆt|t is the estimate at time t using measurements up to time t, xˆt|t−1 is the estimate at
time t using measurements up to time t− 1. Similarly, ρt|t is the covariance of the estimates
at time t using data up to time t and ρt|t−1 is the covariance of the estimates at time t using
data up to time t− 1. Now, the iterations of Kalman Filter can be written as:
Time Update:
xˆt+1|t = Axˆt (3.4)
ρt|t−1 = Aρt−1A
T +Q
The Equation (3.4) projects the state and covariance estimates at t+ 1 time step from
t time step. Here, A is obtained from the state space model and Q is the process noise
covariance matrix.
Measurement Update:
Kt = ρt|t−1C
T
t (Ctρt|t−1C
T
t +R)
−1
ρt|t = ρt|t−1 −KtCtρt|t−1
xˆt = xˆt|t−1 +Kt(yt − Ctxˆt|t−1) (3.5)
Equation (3.5) represents the measurement updates of the Kalman Filter. Kt is the
10
Figure (3.1) Cyber Physical System
Kalman gain and R is the measurement noise covariance matrix. The last two formulae in
Equation (3.5) are used to generate a more accurate estimate by incorporating the measure-
ments yt. The initial condition is x0|−1 = 0, ρ0|−1 = Σ. We assume that the Kalman gain
converges in a few steps and is in a steady state. Finally, a training period is assumed such
that the filter knows the Kalman gain before the estimation, then,
ρ
∆
= lim
k→∞
ρt|t−1,
K = ρCT (CρCT +R)−1 (3.6)
Equation (3.4) can be further updated as:
xˆt+1 = Axˆt +K[yt+1 − C(Axˆt)] (3.7)
Thus, applying the equations above we can obtain the estimates for the state variables
from the previous state variables and the measurements obtained.
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3.2 KF applications
Since R.E. Kalman published his famous paper on Kalman Filter in 1960, Kalman filter
has been the subject of extensive research and application. Some of the applications are
discussed in this section. Applications of KF expands to wide range of areas such as weather
forecasting, target tracking, economics and SCADA system state estimation. In [24] KF
is used to forecast wind speed for wind power prediction. Application of KF in airborne
radar tracking system is studied in [25]. Analysis of the extended Kalman filter applied to
bearings-only target tracking is presented in [26]. Similarly, position and velocity tracking
using KF is studed in [27]. In [28] monthly retail sale estimates revision using KF is studied.
Application of Kalman Filter techniques to power system dynamic state estimation is studied
in [29].
In this dissertation we use KF to predict next state of the smart grid system and the
water supply system. For the smart grid system we consider two different models, first using
sinusoidal voltage equation and second using DC Model. We use Saint-Venant equation to
derive a model for the WSS system to be used with KF. Each of these models and their
integration with KF is discussed in more detail in the upcoming chapters.
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PART 4
DATA INJECTION ATTACK IN SMART GRID
In this chapter, we classify and comprehensively analyze the state-of-the-art studies
in security of smart grid system. As data injection attacks are one of the major concerns
in security of smart grid, we present different mechanisms to detect various types of data
injection attack.
4.1 Data Injection Attack Overview
Smart grid relies on wired/wireless networking infrastructures to integrate the control
system and physical power grid system. Thus, it is important to understand and defend
against cyber attacks that emerge from both the networking and the control infrastructures.
The addition of wired/wireless communication capabilities in the existing power grid system
result in increasing complexity, and potentially more holes in security. The smart grid system
can incorporate the traditional security measures (e.g. intrusion detection and firewall) to
prevent rudimentary attacks like the ones in traditional data networks.
The existing studies on the security of smart grid, can be broadly categorized into
three categories. The work in the first category deals with the wired/wireless networking
security among cyber components in the smart grid [15][16][17][18][19][30][31]. The papers
in the second category investigates the early detection of anomalies in the system. Smart
grid is a real time system and faults/attacks must be handled as soon as possible. The
early anomaly detection schemes [32][33] can pro-actively protect the system. The work in
the third category applies the control theories in the security process using various state
estimation and detection techniques [34] [35] [36].
A wireless mesh network architecture was proposed in [15] for the smart grid system
and an intrusion detection scheme called smart tracking firewall was introduced. To over-
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come the security pitfalls such as signal jamming and eavesdropping, the authors in [15] also
investigated the anti-jamming, physical layer security technique coupled with smart track-
ing firewall. The proposed firewall consists of two agents: intrusion detection agent and
response agent. The agents maintain two lists of misbehaving nodes called the black-list
and the grey-list. These lists keep tracking the malicious nodes in the network. Another
distributed intrusion detection scheme was discussed in [16], which deploys an intelligent
module and an analyzing module along with an artificial immune system to detect and clas-
sify malicious data as well as possible attacks on the smart grid. In [17], secure estimation of
the system states is discussed. The channel capacity requirement to ensure negligible infor-
mation leakage to the adversary regarding the system states and control message is studied
in this chapter. A message authentication scheme was proposed in [18] to achieve the mu-
tual authentication among the smart meters in the smart grid using shared keys and hash
based authentication techniques. Another signature based message authentication scheme
was proposed in [19], which employs the multicast authentication to reduce the signature
size and communication bandwidth at the cost of increased computation. As suggested in
the paper, such authentication scheme is more desirable in the smart grid, where there is a
limitation in the storage size and bandwidth. The work in [30] uses the data concatenation
and random drop schemes to defend traffic analysis attack and the study in [31] is about
defending the internet based load altering attack.
Unlike the papers discussed above that focus mainly on the protection of data com-
munication in the smart grid, the authors in [32] presented an early warning scheme to
predict/prevent anomalous events in advance. The proposed approach consists of detection,
reaction, data recollection and alarm management components. Anomaly detection in the
existing power grid substation was studied in [33], which presents an anomaly inference al-
gorithm based on the combination of transaction-based model, hidden Markov model and
feature-aided tracking.
An attack/fault in the smart grid system is always reflected in the form of change in
either voltage, current or phase [34]. The work in [34] proposed a control-theoretic adaptation
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framework for the system level security of smart grid. The control-theoretic framework uses
the state estimation technique to estimate the data from the remote terminal units and
applies power security analysis tools to detect attacks on the system. However, the proposed
distributed state estimation owns slightly larger data estimation error [34]. Similarly, the
protection for the set of meter measurements or changes was discussed in [35] [36]. The
identification and verification of set of sensor measurements that are required to be protected
in order to detect existence of False Data Injection attack in the smart grid is discussed in
[36].
As discussed above, much of the present work is based on various security techniques
that are originally developed for securing the Internet data communication. While these
techniques are effective in securing the Internet, these security techniques alone are not suffi-
cient to deal with attacks in a more complex CPS such as the smart grid system. Particularly,
the existing techniques did not address the new class of attack called False Data Injection
attack [13]. This type of injection attack is undetectable by detectors used in the existing
state-estimation security frameworks [13],[14]. Hence, this work presents a framework, based
on a state space model derived from the voltage flow equations, to defend different types of
attacks and faults including the False Data Injection attack. We show that the False Data
Injection attack cannot be detected using a traditional combination of estimator and detec-
tor (i.e., KF and χ2-detector). Then, we present a different detector based on Euclidean
distance metric to detect the complicated False Data Injection attack on the power grid
system.
4.2 Proposed Framework For Smart Grid using Kalman Filter
In this section, we present the detailed description of the security framework for smart
grid using Kalman Filter (KF). The framework is capable of detecting various attacks in-
cluding short termed and long termed random attacks along with the powerful False Data
Injection attack on the power system. We develop a state space model (as shown in Sec-
tion 4.2.1) from the 3-phase sinusoidal voltage equations, to integrate with the technique of
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Kalman Filter. Without loss of generality, we assume the use of voltage sensors to measure
the state variables (e.g., amplitude and phase of the voltage) in the framework. The sam-
pling rate for the sensors is assumed to be around 16 samples per 60 Hz cycle i.e. about 960
samples per second for medium to low data rate production [37].
Figure 4.1 shows the security framework where Kalman Filter estimates the values for
the state variables based on the system state and the data from the numerous sensor readings.
The estimated values generated by KF and the observed values for the state variables are
fed into the detector. The detector compares the two state vectors (consisting all the state
variables). If the two differ from each other significantly and are above a certain precomputed
threshold, the detector triggers an alarm to signify a possible attack on the smart grid. As the
literature study shows, the χ2-detector is a typical choice for the Kalman Filter estimators
[38] when the residue of the KF equations follows gaussian distribution and g(t), (as in
Equation (7.17)), follows the χ2 distribution [14]. Attacks such as DoS attack and random
attack are readily detected by the KF and χ2-detector combination. However, False Data
Injection attack can bypass such detectors and may remain undetected [14]. Hence, we use an
additional detector, based on the Euclidean distance, along with χ2-detector. The Euclidean
distance detector reconstructs the sinusoidal voltage signal from the state parameters and
calculates the difference between the estimated and observed voltage signals. If the difference
is larger than a precomputed threshold, the detector triggers an alarm.
4.2.1 State Space Model
Power system deploys sensors or meters such as phasor measurement units to measure
the system state at various locations and time to ensure a smooth operation of the power
system. These meters are able to measure current phase and amplitude [39]. The measure-
ments obtained from these meters/sensors are the state variables that are reported to the
central controller via the wired/wireless communication infrastructure. As stated in [13], the
state variables may include bus voltage, angles and magnitudes. Therefore, the state space
model should reflect these properties of the power system. The study in [34] indicates that
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Figure (4.1) Security framework for the smart grid system
an attack or fault in the power system is always reflected in the form of change in either
voltage, current or phase. Without loss of generality, we derive the state space model from
the power grid voltage signal.
The voltage signal can be represented as a sinusoidal wave [40] as shown in Equation
(8.1). The equation represents voltage as a function of amplitude (Av), angular frequency
wt and phase φ at discrete time. Equation (2) and (3) are mentioned here to represent the
3-phase voltage signal. For simplicity, we only consider Equation (8.1) in the process of
developing the model.
V1(t) = Avcos(ωt+ φ) (4.1)
V2(t) = Avcos(ωt+ φ− 2π
3
) (4.2)
V3(t) = Avcos(ωt+ φ− 4π
3
) (4.3)
Equation (1) can be expanded as follows,
V1(t) = Av ∗ cosωt ∗ cosφ− Av ∗ sinωt ∗ sinφ (4.4)
Assuming the angular frequency is relatively constant over time, we consider amplitude
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and phase as the variables in the state space representation. The equation then becomes,
V1(t) = x1 ∗ cosωt− x2 ∗ sinωt (4.5)
where, x1 = Av ∗ cosφ and x2 = Av ∗ sinφ are defined as the state variables. Assuming
there is no additional delay in the system and considering random noise or small errors picked
up by the system, we have Equation (7.4) representing the state equation over the time.

 x1(t+ 1)
x2(t+ 1)

 =

 1 0
0 1



 x1(t)
x2(t)

+ w(t) (4.6)
Equivalently,
x(t+ 1) =

 1 0
0 1

 x(t) + w(t) (4.7)
where, x(t) =

 x1(t)
x2(t)

 and w(t) is the process noise. Process noise represents the
unmodeled system dynamics or the disturbance inputs in the system model.
The actual voltage signal for the current state using non stationary deterministic vector
[cosωt − sinωt] can be obtained using Equation (7.2) and can be written as shown in
Equation (7.5), where γ(t) represents the measurement noise.
y(t) = [cosωt − sinωt]

 x1(t)
x2(t)

+ γ(t) (4.8)
4.2.2 Kalman Filter
Figure 7.1 shows the control system with the KF embedded for the estimation of the
state vector and detector for the detection of attacks or faults. As shown in Figure 7.1, x(t)
denotes the output of the state estimator that is fed to the controller and Z−1 is the control
system feedback. The observations or sensor readings y(t) are forwarded to the estimator at
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a regular time interval denoted by ∆t. At each time step ∆t, the estimator of the system
generates estimated readings based on the estimates x(t − 1) from previous time step and
the real-time sensor readings y(t).
Figure (4.2) Power grid system
To apply the Kalman Filter technique, the state equation can be written as,
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) + w(t) (4.9)
where, A =

 1 0
0 1


From Equation (7.5), the observation equation for Kalman Filter can be written as:
y(t) = C(t)x(t) + v(t) (4.10)
Here, y(t) is the measurement vector collected from the sensors, C = [cosωt− sinωt], v(t) is
the measurement noise and assumed to be white Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard
deviation σ, which is independent of the initial conditions and process noise.
Kalman Filter can then be applied to compute state estimations xˆ(t) using equations
4.9 and 4.10.
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4.2.3 Generalization of the model
The State space model described in Section 4.2.1 can be generalized for power grid
measurements. The voltage at any given bus can be obtained in the form of a sinusoidal wave
(or phasor representation) using Kirchoff’s Voltage Law (KVL) and/or Kirchoff’s Current
Law (KCL). Let us consider a 3-bus system as shown in the Figure 4.3 as an example.
The voltage amplitude (|Vi|), phase (φi), active power (Pi) and reactive power (Qi) are the
variables in this system. Given a set of known initial values, the values for the unknown
variables at each bus is obtained by solving Equation (4.11) [41]. These equations are
produced by applying KCL at each node. Hence, by solving the power flow problem for the
3-bus system below, the voltage amplitude |Vi| and phase φi at each bus are calculated.
For any bus ′i′ :
Pi =
n∑
k=1
|Vi||Vk|(Gikcos(φi − φk) + sin(φi − φk))
Qi =
n∑
k=1
|Vi||Vk|(Giksin(φi − φk)− cos(φi − φk))
(4.11)
where, |Pi| and |Qi| are the active and reactive power at bus i. |Vi| and φi are the
voltage magnitude and phase at bus i and Yik = Gik + jBik are the Y -bus elements.
As describe in Section 4.2.1, the state variables are x1 = Av ∗ cosφ and x2 = Av ∗ sinφ.
Assuming the system has reached the stable state, these values of |Vi| and φi for bus i,
obtained by solving the power flow equations, can be plugged in to obtain the initial values
for the state variables at t = 0. Once the initial states are known, Equation (4.7) and (7.5)
for the KF of bus i can be used to estimate values for next time step.
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Figure (4.3) 3-bus system
At bus i :
x1(0) = |Vi|cosφi
x2(0) = |Vi|sinφi (4.12)
Equation (4.11) accounts for effect of all the generators and loads in the system at each
bus. Hence, for any bus i, |Vi| and φi obtained after solving this equation reflects the effect of
all the system parameters. An attack/fault on any bus or branch in the system, is reflected
in the form of change in the values of these variables. Since the KF described above uses the
values of |Vi| and φi obtained by solving Equation (4.11) as its initial state, any deflection
in the values due to any attack/fault will cause the values of the state variables to deviate
from the estimated values.
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4.2.4 Attack Model
It is assumed that the attacker is able to control a subset of the sensor readings in the
system. Three types of attacks are considered in this chapter: DoS attack, random attack
and False Data Injection attack.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attack Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a form of attack
where an adversary renders some or all the components of a control system inaccessible.
DoS attack can be launched by jamming of the communication channels, flooding packets in
the network, compromising devices to prevent data transfer etc. by the adversary [20]. DoS
attack could be on sensor data, control data or both. DoS attack is modeled as the lack of
availability of the sensor data.
Random Attack In this case, the attacks are not crafted to overcome the detection
mechanism implemented by the central system. As describe in Equation (4.13), the attacker
simply manipulates the sensor readings.
y′(t) = C(t)x′(t) + v(t) + ya(t) (4.13)
where ya(t) is the random attack vector generated by the attacker. When the system is
under attack y′(t) and x′(t) denote observations and states. These random attacks could be
generated at any point in time and could be a long term continuous attack or a short attack.
False Data Injection Attack In case of False Data Injection attack, it is assumed
that the attacker knows the system model including parameters A,B,C,Q,R and gain K
[42]. The attacker can also control a subset of sensors (Sbad). The attack model can then be
described in Equation (4.14),
y′(t) = C(t)x′(t) + v(t) + τya(t) (4.14)
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where τ = diag(γ1, .....γm) is the sensor selection matrix; γi = 1 if and only if i ∈ Sbad,
otherwise γi = 0; and ya(t) is the malicious input from the attacker.
4.3 Attack/Failure Detector
The KF estimator calculates the following state of the system using the equations de-
scribed in Section 5.3. As the meter readings for that state become available, the projected
estimates and the actual meter readings are compared by the detector. If the difference
between the two is above a precomputed threshold, an alarm is triggered to notify a possible
attack or failure. As previously discussed, the framework presented in this chapter imple-
ments two types of detectors: The χ2-detector and the detector implementing the Euclidean
distance metric.
4.3.1 χ2-detector
The χ2-detector is a conventional detector used with Kalman Filter. As described in
[38], the χ2-detector constructs a χ2 test statistics from the Kalman Filter and compares
them with the threshold obtained from the standard χ2 table.
Now, the residue zk+1 at time k + 1 is defined as:
z(t+ 1)
∆
= y(t+ 1)− yˆ(t+ 1|t)
Equivalently,
z(t+ 1)
∆
= y(t+ 1)− C(Axˆ(t)) (4.15)
Then, the χ2-detector test consists of comparing the scalar test statistics given by:
g(t) = z(t)TB(t)z(t) (4.16)
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where, B(t) is the covariance matrix of z(t). The χ2 detector compares g(t) with a pre-
computed threshold obtained using the χ2-detector-table [38] to identify a failure or attack.
The χ2 test is long-term test because, at each detection step, all integrated effects since
system start time are considered. This property makes it very useful for the fault detection
in smart grid which consists of sensors that are subject to soft failures like instrument bias
shift. Another advantage of χ2 detector is its computational complexity. The parameters
required to perform the test are already generated by the Kalman Filter making it com-
patible with the KF. Furthermore, the threshold for the detector can be easily obtained
from the χ2-table making the threshold computation relatively easy. In our experiments, the
threshold is chosen such that error rate is less than 5%.
False Data Injection attack is characterized by an attack sequence ya such that
lim sup
t→∞
||∆x(t)|| = ∞, ||∆z(t)|| ≤ 1, t = 0, 1, ... where, ||∆x(t)|| = xa(t) − x(t), ||∆z|| =
za(t)− z(t) and xa(t) and za(t) are state variables and residue of the compromised systems
[42]. This definition shows that the χ2-detector may fail to detect False Data Injection at-
tack on the sensors [14]. Thus, we introduce the Euclidean-based detector in the following
section.
4.3.2 Detector implementing the Euclidean Distance Metric
Though χ2 detectors have a high noise tolerance and work in most cases, attacks like
False Data Injection attack fails to get detected [14]. This phenomenon is also visualized
in the simulation results in the Section 4.4. The False Data Injection attack is a class of
attack which is carefully crafted to bypass the statistical detector like χ2-detectors. Thus to
detect these types of attacks, we present an Euclidean-based detector, which calculates the
deviation of the observed data from the estimated data. To apply the Euclidean detector,
we first reconstruct the sinusoidal signals from the state estimates and then compare them
with the measurements obtained from the sensors as shown in Equation (7.19),
d(p, q) =
√
(p1 − q1)2 + (p2 − q2)2 + .....+ (pn − qn)2 (4.17)
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where, p is the amplitude of the voltage signal and q is the amplitude of the estimated voltage
signal.
If the difference between the two is greater than the threshold, as in case of χ2 detector,
an alarm is triggered. To minimize the false positives caused due to the noise, we set the
threshold to 3σ (σ being the standard deviation of the noise from Section 5.3). As stated
earlier, given the Gaussian noise with zero mean, setting the threshold to 3σ can filter out
99.73% false positives due to noise.
Under steady state the input signal can be reconstructed by applying the values of
state variables in Equation (7.3). Similarly the estimated signal can be reconstructed using
Equation (7.3) and xˆ(t) from Equation (3.5).
Hence, the following corollary can be obtained from the definition of False Data Injection
attack in Section 4.3.1.
Given lim sup
t→∞
||∆x(t)|| =∞,
lim
t→∞
d(Va(t), V (t)) =∞
where, d(V (t), Va(t)) =
√
(C(t)xˆa(t)− C(t)x′(t))2.
As ||∆x(t)|| tends to ∞, d(V (t), Va(t)) approaches ∞ as well. Therefore, we can detect
attacks and faults that results from the manipulation of the measured signal such as False
Data Injection attack.
4.4 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
We implemented the KF estimator, χ2-detector and Euclidean detector using Matlab.
The experimental setup and the initial values are shown in Table 4.1. A 60Hz Sinusoidal
voltage signal with random Gaussian noise is generated and fed to the Kalman Filter esti-
mator as the input. Matlab function randn() is used to produce normally distributed noise
with mean value zero. The input signal and the resulting sinusoidal signal obtained using
the state estimates are plotted in Figure 8.1-9 and Figure 11. Each of these figures contains
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two graphs and shows the results of the simulation plotted against time. The top sub-graph
shows how the amplitude varies with time for the input sinusoidal signal and the signal
constructed using estimated state variables. In the bottom sub-graph, the value for g(t)
from Equation (7.17) are plotted against time. The straight horizontal line is the threshold
obtained from the χ2 table. For the Euclidean detectors, d(p, q) from Equation (7.19) is
plotted against time.
Table (4.1) Experimental setup
Frequency 60Hz
Amplitude 1 Volt
Sampling frequency 2 KHz
Initial value for x1(0) 0
Initial value for x2(0) 0
Initial covariance matrix P (0|0) Identity matrix
4.4.1 Attack/Fault detection using χ2 detector
Figure 8.1 shows the simulation results using the χ2-detector in the absence of attack-
s/faults for a certain period of time. It can be seen that the estimated values obtained from
the KF estimator overlaps with the input signal denoting there is no difference between the
estimated and the observed value. Hence for g(t) obtained from the detector stays within
the threshold. Since our simulations also consider the random noise in the system, there is
a slight difference between the estimates and the input signal in the beginning. However,
Kalman Filter works iteratively by correcting its estimates using both the state space model
and the measurements obtained, the estimates gradually converge with the input signal.
In case of attacks, the estimated values do not match with the observed values and g(t)
exceeds the threshold as shown in Figure 4.5. As a result, the detector triggers an alarm
signifying an attack/fault in the system. Similarly, Figure 4.6 shows a short-timed attack
being detected by the framework. Figure 4.7 shows detection of DoS attack.
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Figure (4.4) χ2-detector when there is no attack/fault
4.4.2 False Data Injection Attack
False Data Injection attack injects fake sensor measurements that can fool the system
implementing KF-estimator with χ2-detector as described in [42]. The attack sequence can
be obtained from Equation (4.18).
ya(n+ t) = ya(t)− λ
(i+1)
M
y∗ (4.18)
where, n is the dimension of state space, y∗ = Cv, v=eigenvector of A, |λ| >= 1, M =
maxk=0..n−1||∆z(k)|| and ∆z(k) = z′(k) − z(k). z′(k) is the residue when the system is
under attack.
The derivation of the attack sequence [42] ensures that it bypasses the detector and
increases the error in the state estimation. The second sub graph in Figure 4.8 shows the
behavior of χ2-detector under the False Data Injection attack. We can see the estimates
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Figure (4.5) Continuous random attack detected using χ2-detector
do not agree with the measured values in the top sub graph in Figure 4.8. However, g(t)
never exceeds the threshold. In other words, the graph shows that the statistical tests in
χ2-detector fails to detect the False Data Injection attack. We address this drawback in
the next section, by using Euclidean detector, which can identify such attack by constantly
monitoring the difference between the estimated values and the measured values.
4.4.3 False Data Injection attack detection using Euclidean Detector
The Euclidean detector compares the difference between the measured data and the
estimated data based on the Euclidean distance metric as shown in Equation (7.19). Since
the state variables only consider the time-invariant components of a sinusoid, the state
variables remain relatively constant as described in Section 4.2.1. Thus, change in state
variables could mean either attack or fault in the system. However, to avoid false alarms
due to measurement or system errors, we set the threshold to 3σ as discussed in Section
4.3.2. Figure 5.1 shows the plot of the Euclidean Distance metric when there is no attack
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Figure (4.6) Random attack for a short period of time detected using χ2-detector
in the system and the bottom sub graph in Figure 5.1 shows the plot when there is a False
Data Injection attack in the system. When there is an attack in the system, the difference
between the two curves exceeds the threshold, hence the False Data Injection attack can be
detected by the Euclidean distance metric.
4.4.4 Load Change
In the model derived in this chapter, it is assumed the load in the system remains
constant. In case there is change in load, there will be change in the voltage signal across
the buses. If the load profile is known, then the change in voltage amplitude/phase caused
due to the load change can be predicted. Assume there is a change in the voltage due to load
change as shown in Figure 4.10. The parameters in the Kalman Filter can be adjusted to
reflect the change in the voltage due to the load change. This allows us to obtain estimates
for the state variables after the load change. Figure 4.10 shows that the estimates closely
follow the signal with the load change. At time step 0.07, the random attack is detected by
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Figure (4.7) DoS attack detected using χ2-detector
both the χ2 detector and Euclidean detector in this scenario.
4.4.5 χ2-detector vs. Euclidean detector
The probability of attack detection in both detectors are largely dependent on the value
of the threshold. In the case of χ2-detector, the threshold is obtained from the standard
χ2 table. Similarly, in the case of Euclidean detector, the threshold is obtained from the
standard deviation of Gaussian distribution. In this experiment, we set the value of the
thresholds in both detectors to filter 99% of noise. Thus the probability of false alarms due
to noise is less than 1%.
In general, the Euclidean detector is more sensitive towards changes than χ2-detector.
As can be seen in Figure 4.11, Euclidean detector is faster in responding to the changes.
Hence, if the noise parameters for the system are known, Euclidean detector gives better
results. If the noise parameters are not known in advance, χ2-detector is preferable since
it handles the soft errors better. However, a disadvantage of the χ2-detector relative to
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Figure (4.8) False Data Injection attack using χ2-detector
Euclidean detector is its inability to detect False Data Injection attack. Figure 4.8 shows
the reaction of χ2 detector and Euclidean detector when the system is under the False Data
Injection attack.
Euclidean detector reconstructs the signal from the state estimates and compares it
with the measured signal whereas χ2-detector only computes the residue vector. Since re-
construction requires more computation, Euclidean detector is more resource intensive than
χ2-detector.
4.4.6 Implementation of the security framework in IEEE 9-bus system
Figure 4.12 shows an IEEE 9-bus system with sensors to monitor the state parameters
and the estimator/detector for bus 3. The 9-bus system is simulated using MATPOWER [43]
package in MATLAB. The voltages and phases, obtained by solving the IEEE 9-bus power
system in MATPOWER, are used as the state parameters in the Kalman Filter estimator.
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Figure (4.9) Euclidean detector when there is no attack/fault
Similar structure can be assumed for each bus in the system. For the simplicity, only bus 3
is discussed here. The attack sequence ya is generated by the adversary as discussed in [42].
The sensors in the bus report their readings to the corresponding Kalman Filter estimators
and Euclidean detectors. The successful detection of the False Data Injection attack on bus
3 is shown in the Figure 4.13.
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Figure (4.10) Change in voltage due to load change
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Figure (4.11) Performance of both detectors under the random attack
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Figure (4.12) IEEE 9-bus system under False Data Injection attack
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Figure (4.13) False data attack detection for bus 3 in IEEE 9-bus system
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PART 5
ATTACK DETECTION AND ISOLATION IN SMART GRID
In this chapter, attack detection and isolation in smart grid is presented. Attack isolation
provides mechanism to identify particular node that is under attack. Once the node is
identified, necessary actions can be taken to recover the system from the attack.
5.1 Attack Isolation in Smart Grid Overview
While it is important to detect the attacks and faults in a CPS it is equally important
to identify and isolate specific attacked or failed nodes. In cyber physical systems such as
smart grids, attack isolation is still open and challenging [44] [45] [46] [47] [45] [48]. Fault
Detection and Isolation (FDI) techniques have been used in control systems for identifying
faults and the locations. FDI techniques can be broadly classified into model-based FDI
and signal processing based FDI. Model-based FDI schemes or observer schemes depend
on the measurement residual generated from the observers/filters such as Kalman Filter to
facilitate decision making process [44]. Two observer schemes namely, Dedicated Observer
Scheme (DOS) [45] and Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) [46] can be used for fault
detection and isolation in traditional control systems. GOS scheme is discussed in [49] and
[48] for fault detection in doubly fed induction generators. Similarly, fault detection and
isolation scheme for fractional order systems using the concept of GOS is proposed in [47].
In case of DOS, each observer is driven by a single instrument [45]. DOS is able to detect and
isolate multiple faults at the same time. However, in order to implement DOS, it requires
the system to be observable with any single output, which may not be feasible due to the
complication or cost in a large system [48].
In the following sections we present a new Iterative Observer Scheme (IOS) to identify
the sensors that are being arbitrarily attacked or are at fault in smart grids. The presented
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IOS is based on the technique of Kalman Filter and χ2-detector. With IOS, the readings from
all the sensors are fed into Kalman Filter for attacks/fault detection. Once an attack or fault
is perceived in the system, a smaller subset of sensors consisting of misbehaving sensor(s)
are iteratively selected for processing each time to locate the attacked/faulty nodes. We also
implement the Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) based on the system model. Our study
and comparison show that GOS identifies the attacks/faults on a single sensor while the
IOS can effectively identify the attacks/faults on multiple sensors. In fact, GOS employs m
observers to identify a single misbehaving sensor in constant time. Compared to that, our
scheme uses the same amount of observers to detect all misbehaving nodes in approximately
O(logαm). In our implementation, we set the value of α = 2 and the value of α can be
changed depending on the specific systems. A larger α combined with parallel processing
may actually further speed up our attacks/faults isolation process significantly. Without loss
of generality, we assume the value of α = 2 in the following sections.
5.2 System Model
Sensors such as PMUs that measure the current phase and amplitude [39] are used in
the power system to measure the system state at various locations and time to ensure a
smooth operation of the power system. The measurements obtained from these sensors are
reported to the central controller via the wired/wireless communication infrastructure. As
stated in [13], these measurements include bus voltage, angles and magnitudes. An attack or
fault in the power system is always reflected in the form of change in either voltage, current
or phase [34].
To model the power system, we use the DC power flow model.
Pij =
ViVj
Xij
Sin(θi − θj) (5.1)
where Vi is the voltage magnitude and θi is the phase angle in bus i, Xij is the reactance
of transmission line between bus i and bus j. Since we are using DC power flow model, we
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assume the amplitude of voltage in the buses to be close to unity and the phase difference
between voltage in two buses to be small. Hence Equation (5.1) can further be simplified to
obtain the following equation.
Pij =
θi − θj
Xij
(5.2)
Now, the state-estimation objective is to estimate n phase angles θi via m real-time
measurements. In power flow studies [50], only n− 1 angles need to be estimated since the
voltage phase angle (θi) of the reference bus is fixed and known. The state vector, θ, is
defined as θ = [θ1, ...., θn]
T .
Similarly, the observation vector can be described as Equation (5.3).
z = P (θ) + e (5.3)
where z = [z1, ...., zm]
T is the vector of measured active power in transmission lines,
P (θ) is the non-linear relation between measurement vector z and state vector θ and e =
[e1, ...., em]
T is the Gaussian measurement error vector with covariance matrix σe
The control center computes vector z from m active power measurement data. These
measurements can either be the injected active power to bus i (σjPij) or the transmitted
active power from bus i to bus j (Pij).
Defining the Jacobian matrix H ∈ Rm as
H =
δP (θ)
δθ
|θ=0 (5.4)
If the phase differences (θi−θj) in Equation (5.3) is small, then the linear approximation
model of Equation (5.4) can be obtained as:
z = Hθ + e (5.5)
Further, the following equation for the system can be established to describe the states in
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time series.
θt+1 = θt + ωt (5.6)
where θt+1 is the state vector θ at time t+ 1.
5.3 Kalman Filter
In this section, we introduce the Kalman Filter (KF) [22] technique to obtain estimates
for the state space vector xt described in the above section. To apply the Kalman Filter
technique, we use xt to represent θt and the state equation can be written as,
xt+1 = Axt + wt (5.7)
where, xt+1 = θt+1 and A is the unity matrix. The observation equation for Kalman Filter
from Equation (5.5) can be written as:
yt = Ctxt + vt (5.8)
Here, yt is the measurement vector z, Ct = Ht and vt is the measurement noise which is
independent of the initial conditions and process noise. Both wt and vt are assumed to be
white Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard deviation σ.
Kalman Filter can then be applied to compute state estimations xˆt.
5.4 Attacks/Failures Detector and Identifier
After the KF estimator calculates the next state of the system and the sensor readings
are available, the detector compares the estimates and the actual sensor readings to detect
any disagreement.
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5.4.1 χ2-detector
The χ2-detector is a conventional detector used with Kalman Filter. As described in
[38], the χ2-detector detector constructs a χ2 test statistics from the Kalman Filter and
compares them with a pre-computed threshold. Now, let us define the residue rk+1 at time
k + 1 as:
rt+1
∆
= yt+1 − yˆt+1|t (5.9)
From Equation (5.8) and (5.9), we get,
rt+1
∆
= yt+1 − C(Axˆt) (5.10)
Then, the χ2-detector test consists of comparing the scalar test statistics given by:
g(t) = rTt Btrt (5.11)
where Bt is the covariance matrix of rt. The χ
2 detector compares g(t) with a pre-
computed threshold obtained using the χ2-detector-table [38] to identify a failure or attack.
χ2 test is long-term test because, at each detection step, all integrated effects since system
starting time are considered. This property makes it very useful for the fault detection in
the smart grid, which consists of sensors that are subject to soft failures like instrument
bias shift. Another advantage of χ2 detector is its computational straightforwardness. The
parameters required to perform the test are already generated by the Kalman Filter, making
it compatible with the KF. Furthermore, the threshold for the detector can be conveniently
obtained from the χ2-table.
5.4.2 Filter Bank for Attacks/Faults Isolation
Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) To handle the problem of attacks and faults
isolation, filter banks can be used to estimate the dynamic behaviors of the system [48]. In
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this chapter one of the filter banks, Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) [46], is implemented.
The filter bank consists of many observers. Each observer is supplied with different subsets
of output and all of the input of the system.
Assume that the power grid system consists of m observers. The GOS is designed such
that the ith observer is driven by the input u and all of the m outputs except yi. As described
in Figure 5.1 the ith observer is invariant to the fault of the measurement of yi. Therefore,
the residual vector ri depends on all but the i
th sensor reading. Each residual vector ri is
composed of m elements ri = [ri1, ri2, ......, rim] where rii = 0. These residual vectors are
fed to the decision unit (the χ2-detector in our implementation) which detects and isolates
attacks or faults that are identified.
Figure (5.1) GOS using Kalman Filter
Iterative Observer Scheme (IOS) As to be shown in Section V, the GOS scheme
can only detect attacks/faults on one sensor at a time. Hence, we present an Iterative
Observer Scheme (IOS) to detect and isolate multiple attacked nodes. In step 1, we start
with a single Kalman Filter and χ2-detector combination to check for an attack. This takes
all the m outputs into account. If an attack is found, we proceed to step 2. In this step,
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we divide the m outputs into two subgroups and use them to drive two observers. The first
observer is driven by the input u and first half of the m outputs. Similarly, the second
observer is driven by the input u and second half of the m outputs. Hence, we check for
attacks in outputs 1 to ⌈m/2⌉ and ⌈m/2⌉ + 1 to m separately. This process is repeated
iteratively for each half of the subset whenever the attack/fault is detected. The iteration
terminates when the size of the subset becomes less than or equal to user defined cut off
parameter λ such that λ ≥ 1.
In this chapter, for the simplicity, every time an attack/fault is encountered, the size of
the subset is divided by half and the detection operation is performed on each half repeatedly.
In the absence of attacks/faults, we discontinue the isolation process on that subset. In
our implementation, the algorithm terminates when λ = 2. It can be seen that for m
measurements, maximum of 2m−1 computations are required and there are at most log2(m)
steps. However, it is worth noting that the division of a subset into smaller subsets can be
carried out differently depending on the specific scenarios such as the physical distribution of
the sensors. Generally, if one divides the set into α subsets in each iteration, the maximum
steps will be O(logαm). Clearly, parallel processing techniques can be employed to speed up
for quick real-time isolation.
5.5 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
The Kalman Filter estimator, the χ2-detector and observers are implemented using
Matlab. MATPOWER package was used for solving the IEEE 9-bus and IEEE 14-bus
systems [43]. Particularly MATPOWER was used to obtain matrix H which is used in the
state estimation. Matlab function randn() was used to produce normally distributed noise
with mean value zero. The threshold was obtained from the χ2 table.
5.5.1 Fault detection and isolation using GOS
Figure 5.3 shows the detection of an attack on a single bus (Bus 5) using GOS scheme
in IEEE 9-bus system. As it can be seen in the figure, since Observer 5 is not affected by
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Figure (5.2) Iterative observer scheme using Kalman Filter showing first three iterations.
measurement y5, the residue function g(t) does not exceed the threshold denoted by the
straight line. However, the remaining eight observers are affected by the attack. Hence,
GOS shows that there is an attack on Bus 5.
In Figure 5.4, two attacks occur at the IEEE 9-bus system. It can be seen that the
residue function g(t) exceeds the threshold in all the GOS observers. Hence, GOS is unable
to detect simultaneous attacks/faults in the system.
5.5.2 Fault detection and isolation using IOS
Figure 5.5 shows the result of the Iterative Observer Scheme (IOS) in IEEE 9-bus
system. The graph on the top row shows the results after applying KF and χ2-detector on
the entire system. Since the residue function g(t) exceeds the threshold, an attack is detected
in the Step 1. Following this, the scheme divides the 9 outputs into two halves: 1 − 5 and
6−9 in Step 2. These two subsets of measurements are fed into two separate observers. The
residue functions obtained from the observers are plotted in the graphs in the second row
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Figure (5.3) Simulation result showing detection of attack on bus 5 using GOS in IEEE 9-bus
system.
of this figure. Again, it can be seen that there are attacks on both of these subsets. As a
result, the scheme splits these subsets again into two halves each, thus creating four subsets:
1 − 3, 4 − 5, 6 − 7 and 8 − 9. When these subsets are fed to the observers, we obtain the
residue functions as shown in the last row of the figure. It can be seen that g(t) of the first
and the last figure in this row (buses 1−3 and buses 8−9) exceed the threshold. This shows
that there are attacks on these sets of buses. Similarly, the simulation graphs resulting from
applying IOS on IEEE 14-bus is shown in Figure 5.6. In this figure, buses 3, 8 and 11 are
under attack.
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Figure (5.4) Simulation results showing failure in detection of attack using GOS in IEEE
9-bus system when there were attacks on two separate buses- Bus 5 and 8.
5.5.3 Comparison of GOS and IOS
GOS IOS
Detects multiple simultaneous attacks No Yes
Number of computations in worst case m 2m− 1
Number of computations in best case m 2logm− 1
Table (5.1) Comparison of GOS and IOS.
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Figure (5.5) Simulation results showing attack on bus 2 and bus 8 for IEEE 9-bus using IOS.
Table 5.1 compares the GOS and IOS schemes based the number of computations re-
quired for the best case and the worst case scenarios. In case of GOS, since it only detects a
single attack at a time, the best case and the worst case are the same. GOS uses m observers
and assuming each observer does unit computation, the total number of computations re-
quired is m for all cases. For IOS, in worst case all the buses are under attack. Hence all of
the subsets are checked for attacks in each iteration resulting in total 2m− 1 computations.
In the best case, only a single bus is attacked. In this scenario, only two subsets are checked
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Figure (5.6) Simulation results showing attack on bus 3, 8 and 11 for IEEE 14-bus using
IOS.
for attacks in each iteration except the first. Thus the total number of computations required
is 2logm− 1.
46
PART 6
LOAD SCHEDULING IN SMART GRID
In this chapter, we present our study on load scheduling for a building in smart grid.
Scheduling is important as it affects the overall energy signatures, which in turn, relates
to malicious activities in smart grid. The scheduling algorithm proposed in this chapter
maximizes the user comfort given the power and cost budgets.
6.1 Load Scheduling overview
Electricity, has become one of the most valuable commodities due to the increasing
number of electrical appliances embedded in our daily lives. Given the energy challenges in
the world, the need for optimizing energy consumption by these appliances, has grown. This
need, not only relates to the commercial industries but also extends to the residential sector
[51]. The advent of smart grids enables real-time energy consumption reading, load shifting
and energy prices, which also promotes the consumers to optimize/manage the operation
schedule of these appliances to reduce the electricity cost.
Different aspects of Home Energy Management (HEM) systems have been studied in
the literature. Most of these studies focus on algorithms to effectively schedule the usage of
these household appliances to minimize the electricity cost. For example, in [52] the collective
impact of several different HEMs based on sharing appliances is studied. The study in [53]
investigates the issue where all consumers might operate the appliances during the lowest
electricity price. In [54], the authors demonstrate a HEM scheme with a smart thermostat
control which allows the consumers to adjust its usage during the demand response (DR)
periods. Similar work is presented in [55] where the authors have used sensor networks
and taken other factors like lighting into consideration. In [56], the authors present their
analysis on how the implementation of Smart HEMs could contribute to energy savings
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for the residents. Optimizing HEM by integrating additional diverse energy sources like
photovoltaic (PV), thermal energy and fuel cells using dynamic programming have been
studied in [57].
In addition to optimizing the energy cost, the relation between user comfort and energy
consumption is recently drawing much interest. Authors in [58] present three algorithms to
reduce the peak loads of the home electronic appliances and rank these algorithms based on
the inconvenience caused to the consumers. Their studies show that the different appliances
are best scheduled with different algorithms. Authors in [59] extend this idea by allowing
consumers to set different weights to different tasks. Their study on correlating the con-
sumer inconvenience with the potential savings in the electricity cost shows that the savings
potential decreases as more comfort is sacrificed. The energy saving versus the user require-
ments are translated into optimization of a constrained boolean satisfiability problem in [60],
where the user specifications are converted into boolean expressions. A three layer architec-
ture has been proposed in [61] to satisfy the maximum available electrical power constraint
and to maximize user satisfaction criteria. The Linear Programming (LP) model developed
in [62] maximizes user comfort by minimizing temperature difference between desired and
indoor temperature. However, none of the above works consider the interruption of loads
and possible blocking the appliances’ energy request for a household HEM or building office.
In this chapter, we present a Linear Programming (LP) model, to maximize the user
comfort in a residential HEM systems as well as a small office building via scheduling.
Our model for HEM assumes that loads like washer/dryer and EV are deferrable as well
as interruptible. Similarly, for office buildings, loads such as batch printing/photocopying
are considered deferrable and interruptible. An iterative greedy algorithm (CPG) is also
proposed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we classify the different
appliances into different categories. Section 6.3 provides the problem definition. In Section
6.4, the linear programming model is described. The Comfort Prioritizing Greedy (CPG)
algorithm is introduced in Section 6.5. In Section 6.6, a bin-packing algorithm is discussed.
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Section 6.7, the simulation results for both HEM and small office are shown.
6.2 Appliance Classification
In this chapter we classify the appliances in a building (house or office) into different
categories based on various attributes of the appliances. These categories are described in
the list below.
• Non deferrable and non interruptible load : includes appliances with a fixed start time
that cannot be changed and should not be interrupted; for example, refrigerator, light-
ing, servers.
• Deferrable and interruptible load : includes appliances with a flexible start time and
can be interrupted. The only constraint is that the operation should start and end
within a given start and end time. We consider washer/dryer and dishwasher to be
interruptible load as it is possible to interrupt them at any given time and start it
again at a later time. In case of small office building, batch printing/photocopying
jobs are considered to be deferrable and interruptible.
• Deferrable and non-interruptible load : includes appliances that has a flexible start
time as long as it is within a given time frame and should not be interrupted. For
interruptible appliances, a minimum gap between interruptions can be set to disallow
frequent interruptions.
• Non deferrable and interruptible load: includes appliances that has a fixed start time
and can be interrupted.
6.3 Problem Definition
In this work, we model the load scheduling problem as an optimization problem. Given
the power and budget constraints, indoor temperature, outdoor temperature, desired tem-
perature, the amount of power required to maintain the desired temperature and various
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other loads that require power allocation, our goal is to maximize the user comfort at any
given time t. It is assumed that the user is most comfortable when the room temperature
is close to the desired temperature. Hence, if δ = |xint − desiredtemp|, the user is most
comfortable when δ ≃ 0 and less comfortable with the increasing values of δ. In other words,
the problem can be formulated as a LP problem whose goal is to minimize the tempera-
ture difference between the indoor and desired temperature at time t by allocating power to
HVAC.
6.4 LP model
In this section, we present the LP model for the problem described above. We assume
the power required by HVAC to obtain the desired temperature is calculated in advance
and is available for the HEM to use. As described in [62], the power required by HVAC
to reach the desired temperature when outdoor and indoor temperatures are known can be
obtained using Equation (6.1). Hence, we assume the power required to maintain the indoor
temperature at xint , when the outdoor temperature is x
out
t , to be formulated as Equation (5).
The value of ǫt for each hour is known in advance.
xint+1 = x
in
t + α(x
out
t − xint +GPHV ACt + c+ ω(t)) (6.1)
where, α, G and c are the parameters estimated using historical data, xint+1 is the indoor
temperature at time t + 1, xint is the indoor temperature at time t, x
out
t is the outdoor
temperature at time t and PHV ACt is the power consumed by HVAC to achieve the desired
temperature.
To model the power consumption by Electric Vehicle, HVAC, and deferrable and in-
terruptible loads (washer, dryer and dishwasher), we define the variables in Table 6.1. It
is assumed that maximum power consumption for each load type PHV ACmax , P
V E
max, P
INTR
max is
known. Then the objective function of our proposed linear programming model is to mini-
mize the temperature difference i.e. to minimize |xint − desiredtemp|. This absolute formula
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can be replaced with linear equations in Eq.(2), (3) and (4).
minimize
Tn−1∑
0
X ′t (6.2)
subject to xint − desiredtemp < X ′t (6.3)
−(xint − desiredtemp) < X ′t (6.4)
PHV ACt = ǫt(x
out
t − xint ) (6.5)
0 ≤ PHV ACt ≤ PHV ACmax . (6.6)
TV Ee∑
TV Es
P V Et = Q (6.7)
0 ≤ P V Et ≤ P V Emax. (6.8)
T
INTRi
e∑
T
INTRi
s
P INTRit = Ri (6.9)
0 ≤ P INTRit ≤ P INTRimax . (6.10)
Tn−1∑
0
zt(P
HV AC
t + P
V E
t + P
INTRi
t ) (6.11)
≤ B
0 ≤ PHV ACt + P V Et + P INTRit (6.12)
≤ Pmaxt
6.5 Comfort Prioritizing Greedy (CPG) Algorithm
This section presents an iterative greedy algorithm to solve the optimization problem
described in Section 6.3. We begin by defining a threshold temperature which is different from
the desired temperature, and is acceptable indoor temperature for the user. For instance,
if the desire temperature is 74◦F then 76◦F might be a reasonable acceptable temperature.
We use threshold temperature to ensure devices other than HVAC will not starve. Since we
are trying to optimize the user comfort, our first priority is to assign power to HVAC such
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Algorithm 1 The Comfort Prioritizing Greedy (CPG) Algorithm
1: sort the list of time slots according to the price profile available
2: define a threshold temperature which the user would like to achieve in say γ
3: Total power assigned for vehicle charging P V Etotal = 0
4: Total power assigned to the interruptible loadP INTRtotal = 0
5: Total budget spent cost = 0;
6: for Each timeslot t, starting from the least cost time slot do
7: if cost < B then
8: assign power to PHV ACt which is required to achieve the threshold temperature γ
9: update the total power available P availablet = P
max
t − PHV ACt
10: cost+ = zt ∗ PHV ACt
11: xint = γ
12: end if
13: end for
14: for Each timeslot t, starting from the least cost time slot do
15: if T V Es ≤ t ≤ T V Ee AND P V Etotal < Q AND Pavailable > 0 AND cost < B then
16: if P availablet >= P
V E
max then
17: P V Et = P
V E
max
18: P availablet + = P
V E
max
19: cost+ = zt ∗ P V Emax
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: for Each timeslot t, starting from the least cost timeslot do
24: if T INTRs ≤ t ≤ T INTRe AND P INTRtotal < R AND Pavailable > 0 AND cost < B then
25: if P availablet >= P
INTR
max then
26: P INTRt = P
INTR
max
27: P availablet + = P
INTR
max
28: cost+ = zt ∗ P V Emax
29: end if
30: end if
31: end for
32: for Each timeslot t, starting from the least cost timeslot do
33: if P availablet > 0 AND cost < B then
34: if power is adequate and budget is available then
35: Adjust the temperature to desiredtemp
36: else
37: Adjust the temperature to reach closest to the desired temperature
38: end if
39: end if
40: end for
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Table (6.1) Variable list
Variable Description
xint Indoor temperature
xoutt Outdoor temperature
desiredtemp Desired temperature
zt Hourly electricity price
PHV ACt Power consumed by HVAC
P V Et Power consumed by electric vehicle
P INTRit Power consumed by i
th interruptible load
PHV ACmax Maximum power consumption of HVAC
P V Emax Maximum power consumption of electric vehicle
P INTRimax Maximum power consumption of i
th interruptible load
Q Desired charging amount of electric vehicle
R Total power required by the interruptible load
Pmaxt Total power consumption within hour t
B Total budget for the day
T V Es Starting time for charging the vehicle
T V Ee Ending time for charging the vehicle
T INTRis Starting time of i
th interruptible and deferrable load
T INTRie Ending time of i
th interruptible and deferrable load
that indoor temperature can achieve the threshold temperature, in case of budget or power
shortage.
In the proposed CPG algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1 and the flowchart in Figure
6.1, the time slots are sorted in an ascending order of the hourly electricity price (zt) (Line 1
in Algorithm 1). Lines 2-6 are used to initialize required variables. Then, the following four
iterations are carried out.
• First Iteration (Lines 7-13 in Algorithm 1): starting from the time slot with the lowest
price, power is assigned to HVAC to achieve the given threshold temperature.
• Second iteration (Lines 14-22): starting from the time slot with the lowest price, power
is assigned to charge the electric vehicle without exceeding the maximum power con-
straint and the budget constraint.
• Third iteration (Lines 23-31): starting from the time slot with the lowest price, power
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is assigned to the remaining deferrable and interruptible loads without exceeding the
maximum power and budget constraint. If at any point power cannot be assigned
in these iterations because the budget constraint is exceeded then the threshold tem-
perature is changed (increased in summer and decreased in winter) by 1◦F and the
algorithm is executed again from the beginning. Similarly, if any of the appliances
cannot be scheduled because the power constraint is exceeded then the threshold tem-
perature is changed and the algorithm is executed again.
• Fourth iteration (Lines 35-40): if power and budget is available then, the algorithm
goes back and assigns power to HVAC so that the desired temperature can be obtained.
The algorithm stops after completion of the last iteration or if the budget constraint
is exceeded before the last iteration is completed.
6.6 Bin-packing Algorithm
In this section, we apply the standard technique of bin-packing to our load scheduling
problem. Here, we consider the maximum power available at each hour to be the bin and try
to pack as many appliances as possible in each of these bins without exceeding the budget
constraint. For each time slot, if budget is available, assign the power required to achieve
desired temperature to the HVAC. If there is space remaining in the bucket, i.e., the total
power limit for that hour is not exceeded then assign power to the electric vehicle. Next, if
there is still space then we assign power to the deferrable and interruptible loads for that
time slot. The above power assignment is repeated for each time slot. The detailed steps are
listed in Algorithm 2. Note, there can be appliances that cannot be scheduled while using
this algorithm if the budget constraint is exceeded.
Lines(1-3) in the Algorithm 2 are used to initialize the required variables. Then, for
each time slot, lines (5-7) are used to assign power to HVAC, and update available power
and budget. Lines (8-14) assign power to the electric vehicle, and update available power
and budget. If maximum power constraint is not exceeded for that time slot and budget is
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available then lines (15-21) assign power to the interruptible loads.
Algorithm 2 The Bin-packing algorithm
1: Total power assigned for vehicle charging P V Etotal = 0
2: Total power assigned to the interruptible loadP INTRtotal = 0
3: Total money available cost = B
4: For Each timeslot t if cost > 0,
5: assign power to PHV ACt which is required to achieve the desired temperature desiredtemp
6: update the total power available P availablet = P
max
t − PHV ACt
7: total budget available cost− = PHV ACt ∗ zt
8: if T V Es ≤ t ≤ T V Ee AND P V Etotal < Q AND Pavailable > 0 And cost > 0 then
9: if P availablet >= P
V E
max then
10: P V Et = P
V E
max
11: P availablet + = P
V E
max
12: cost− = P V Et ∗ zt
13: end if
14: end if
15: if T INTRs ≤ t ≤ T INTRe AND P INTRtotal < R AND Pavailable > 0 AND cost > 0 then
16: if P availablet >= P
INTR
max then
17: P INTRt = P
INTR
max
18: P availablet + = P
INTR
max
19: cost− = P INTRt ∗ zt
20: end if
21: end if
6.7 Simulation results
The simulation is performed using LPSolve for solving the LP formulations 6.3. The
proposed CPG algorithm and the bin-packing algorithm are implemented using Java. The
hourly price chart and outdoor temperature for 24 hours is shown in Figure 6.2 and Figure
6.3 respectively. We simulate a typical household with HVAC, and four appliances (Electric
vehicle, washing machine, dryer, dishwasher) as well as an office building with HVAC and
two deferrable and interruptible loads (batch jobs in photocopy machine and printers). The
office appliances such as servers, workstations, projectors, printers, photocopy machine are
considered as non deferrable and non interruptible loads. It is assumed that the batch
printing and batch photocopying jobs have a start and an end time, and can be put in a
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Table (6.2) Appliances and their time and power consumptions
Appliance Power Start time Stop time Total power
EV 3.3 kw 19:00 7:00 19.8
Washing machine 0.5 kw 8:00 17:00 0.5
Dryer 4 kw 17:00 20:00 4
Dish Washer 1.5 20:00 5:00 3
Table (6.3) The energy schedule for appliances in a household
Algorithm EV Washer Dryer Dishwasher
LP 1:00-6:00 17:00 18:00 2:00
Greedy 1:00-6:00 9:00 18:00 1:00
Bin-packing 1:00-6:00 9:00 - 1:00
queue.
The power consumption model for the household HEM is described in Table 6.2. This
data is obtained from [63], where the maximum power in one hour is 15 KW and the desired
temperature is set to 74◦F
When the budget is large and all the constraints are met, all three algorithms are able
to accomodate all the appliances and the desired temperature as shown in Figure 6.4.
At the expense of denying any power to Dryer, the bin-packing algorithm does the best
job in maintaining indoor temperature close to the desired temperature most of the day. The
temperature spikes in Figure 6.5 are due to the rise in the outdoor temperature at that time.
One can see that the LP modelling responds to the jump of outside temperature slightly
slower while the CPG algorithm outperforms the other two in maintaining a smooth indoor
temperature.
Figure 6.6 shows the performance of CPG algorithm when the threshold is 79◦F ,77◦F ,
75◦F respectively. When the threshold for the CPG algorithm is 79◦F and 77◦F , all the
appliances are scheduled. However, when the threshold was set to 75◦F it can not schedule
washer, dryer and dishwasher. Figure 6.6 shows that the performance is better when the
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threshold is set to 77◦F than when it is set to 79◦F . This imples that if the value of the
threshold can be set closer to the desired temperature without blocking any of the appliances,
then a better performance can be obtained.
The power consumption model for office includes the HVAC and two deferrable loads
of batch printing, and batch photocopying. The maximum power in one hour is 20 KW and
the desired temperature is set to 74◦F . Table 6.4 lists the power consumption, and start/end
times for these jobs when the budget is enough. However, when the budget is limited to
200 cents, the bin-packing algorithm can not schedule the printer while the other two can
accommodate all the jobs. Again, as shown in Figure 6.7, the overall performance of the
CPG algorithm is slightly better that the other two.
Table (6.4) The energy schedule for appliances in an office
Appliance Power Start time Stop time Total power
Batch Printing 2.4 KW 18:00 7:00 7.2 KW
Batch Photocopying 1.5 KW 18:00 7:00 3 KW
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Figure (6.1) The flow chart describing the CPG algorithm
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PART 7
TOWARDS THE SECURED CPS: A CASE STUDY ON ATTACKS OF
WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM
Water Supply system is another important CPS. In this chapter, we study different
types of attacks on WSS and build a framework capable of detecting those attacks.
7.1 Attacks on WSS overview
Water supply system is one of the sensitive areas which can have dramatic public health
and economical impacts when attacked. As new types of sensors have been introduced to
detect the existing attacks, newer types of attack patterns to thwart this effort has also
emerged. Thus in this chapter we look into the existing attack and detection models and
present our technique.
The recent literature [64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69] largely focus on detecting attacks targeted
towards the quality of water in the supply system. In this regard, the attack detection can
be classified into two groups. The first group deals with the deployment of different types of
sensors to detect water quality and the second focuses on strategically placing the sensors in
WSS.
Notable works in the first group include a taste sensor called Electronic Tongue [64].
As stated in the paper, the sensor is based on voltametric technique and is able to detect
small changes in the chemical and bacterial compound in the water. Similarly, an advanced
nanomaterial based sensor is presented in [65] for continuous and in-situ monitoring of various
organic along with non-organic pollutants in water.
The second group deals with attack detection schemes primarily focusing on the sensor
placement problem. The authors in [66] focus on minimizing the number of sensors as well
as minimizing the effect of attacks on general public by efficiently positioning sensors in the
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WSS. Data mining techniques are applied in [68] to find the optimal location for the sensor
placement to determine drinking water quality. The authors of [67] proposed a technique
to optimally choose online monitoring points to monitor municipal water supply system for
prediction and early detection of contaminants. In both these groups, sensors are consid-
ered accurate/reliable and attacks on sensors to manipulate actual sensor readings are not
considered. The authors of [69] used theory of switching boundary control of partial differ-
ential equations to model deception attacks on water SCADA system. The paper presented
a stealthy deception attack that can evade detection by manipulating sensor measurements.
However, it does not provide any specific mechanism to detect such an attack on SCADA
system.
Though recent studies focus on the detecting attacks on the quality of water using
sensors, there has not been adequate research in detecting attack on the sensors themselves
in WSS. Our work addresses this issue.
7.2 Modeling the Water Supply System
We begin by modeling the WSS using the Saint-Venant equations. For a steady state
water flow, the hyperbolic and continuous Saint-Venant model are then linearized and dis-
cretized for its direct application in the Kalman Filter (to be discussed in next section).
7.2.1 The Saint-Venant Model
The Saint-Venant equations are derived from the conservation of mass and momentum
[70]. These equations are first order hyperbolic nonlinear partial differential equations and
for one dimensional flow with no lateral inflow, these equations can be written as:
T
δH
δt
+
δQ
δx
= 0 (7.1)
δQ
δt
+
δ
δx
(
Q2
A
)
+
δ
δx
(ghcA) = gA(Sb − Sf ) (7.2)
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for (x, t) ∈ (0, L)XR+, where L is the length of the flow (m), Q(x, t) = V (x, t)A(x, t) is the
discharge or flow (m3/s) across cross section, A(x, t) = T (x)H(x, t).V (x, t) refers to velocity
(m/s), H(x, t) refers to water depth (m) and T (x, t) refers to the free surface width (m),
Sf (x,y) is the friction slope, Sb is the bed slope and g is the gravitational acceleration (m/s
2),
These equations can be elaborated [71] in terms of water depth and velocity as:
T
δH
δt
+
δ(THV )
δx
= 0 (7.3)
δV
δt
+ V
δV
δx
+ g
δH
δx
= g(Sb − Sf ) (7.4)
The friction is empirically modeled by the Manning-Stickler’s formula:
Sf =
m2V |V |(T + 2H) 43 )
(TH)
4
3
(7.5)
where m is the Manning’s roughness coefficient (s/m
1
3 )
7.2.2 Steady State Flow
There exists a steady state solution of the Saint-Venant equations under constant bound-
ary conditions [70]. We denote the variables corresponding to the steady state condition by
adding suffix 0. By excluding term containing δt and expanding equation (7.3), we obtain
the following equation:
dV0(x)
dx
= − V0(x)
H0(x)
dH0(x)
dx
− V0(x)
T (x)
dT (x)
dx
(7.6)
Solving (7.4) and (7.6), we get,
dH0(x)
dx
=
Sb − Sf
1− F0(x)2 (7.7)
with F0 = V0/C0, C0 =
√
gH0. Here C0 is the gravity wave celerity, F0 is the Froude number.
We assume the flow to be subcritical i.e, F0 < 1 [70].
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7.2.3 Linearized Saint-Venant Model
The linearized Saint-Venant model can be obtained from the steady-state flow charac-
terized by V0 and H0 [70]. Let, v(x, y) and h(x, y) denote the first-order perturbations in
water velocity and water level. Then,
V (x, t) = V0(x, t) + v(x, t) (7.8)
H(x, t) = H0(x, t) + h(x, t) (7.9)
The values of H and V are substituted in equation (7.3) and (7.4) and expanded in Taylor
Series. We use T0 in place of T to emphasize that it is uniform. As described in [70]
neglecting higher order terms, a given term f(V,H) of Saint-Venant model can be written
as: f(V,H) = f(V0, H0) + (fV )0v + (fH)0h in which, ()0 indicates steady state conditions.
The linearized Saint-Venant equations can be obtained as the following [71],[72].
ht +H0(x)vx + V0(x)hx + α(x)v + β(x)h = 0 (7.10)
vt + V0(x)vx + ghx + γ(x)v + η(x)h = 0 (7.11)
where α(x), β(x), γ(x) and η(x) are given by,
α(x) =
dH0
dx
+
H0
T
dT0
dx
(7.12)
β(x) = − V0
H0
dH0(x)
dx
− V0(x)
T (x)
dT (x)
dx
(7.13)
γ(x) = 2gm2
|V0|
H
4
3
0
− V0
H0
dH0(x)
dx
− V0(x)
T (x)
dT (x)
dx
(7.14)
η(x) = −4
3
gm2
V0|V0|
H
7
3
0
(7.15)
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7.2.4 Discretization
In order to discretize the linear equations generated in previous section, we use the Lax
Diffusive Scheme [71] as listed below. The channel is divided into smaller segments of length
∆x and a suitable time interval ∆t is selected.
δv
δt
=
vk+1i − 12(vki+1 + vki−1)
∆t
(7.16)
δv
δx
=
(vki+1 + v
k
i−1)
2∆x
(7.17)
δh
δt
=
hk+1i − 12(hki+1 + hki−1)
∆t
(7.18)
δh
δx
=
(hki+1 + h
k
i−1)
2∆x
(7.19)
Given (hki , v
k
i )
I
i=0 , we want to compute (h
k+1
i , v
k+1
i )
I
i=0. Here I is the total number of segments
of length ∆x. The updated equations for (hi, vi) are:
hk+1i =
1
2
(hki+1 + h
k
i−1)
− ∆t
4∆x
(H0(i+1) +H0(i−1))(v
k
i+1 − vki−1)
− ∆t
4∆x
(V0(i+1) + V0(i−1))(h
k
i+1 − hki−1)
−∆t
2
αi+1v
k
i+1 + αi−1v
k
i−1
−∆t
2
βi+1h
k
i+1 + βi−1h
k
i−1 (7.20)
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vk+1i =
1
2
(vki+1 + v
k
i−1)
− ∆t
4∆x
(V0(i+1) + V0(i−1))(v
k
i+1 − vki−1)
− g∆t
2∆x
(hki+1 − hki−1)
−∆t
2
γi+1v
k
i+1 + γi−1v
k
i−1
−∆t
2
ηi+1h
k
i+1 + ηi−1h
k
i−1 (7.21)
We assume that ∆x is very small then we can write that hi−1 = hi = hi+1 and vi−1 =
vi = vi+1. The above equations will become:
hk+1i = (1−
∆t
2
βi + βi)h
k
i
+(αi − ∆t
2
αi)v
k
i (7.22)
vk+1i = (ηi −
∆t
2
ηi)h
k
i
+(1− ∆t
2
γi + γi)v
k
i (7.23)
7.2.5 Discrete Linear State-Space Model
From the discretized equations in previous section, state-space model can be formed as
follows:
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + w(k) (7.24)
where, x(k) = (vk0 , ......, v
k
I , h
k
0, ......, h
k
I )
T , with the applied control u(k) in the form of dis-
charge perturbation at the upstream end vk0 and the discharge perturbation w(k) at the
downstream end vkI [70]. Here, wk, x0 are independent Gaussian random variables, and
x0 ∼ N (0,Σ) and wk ∼ N (0, Q).
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Figure (7.1) Kalman Filter
7.3 Detecting Attacks using Kalman Filter
In this section, we introduce the Kalman Filter [22] technique to obtain estimates for
the state space vector x(k) described in Section 7.2.5. Figure 7.1 shows the control system
of the Kalman Filter with the sensor readings or observations from the water supply system
namely, yi. And xi denotes the output of the control system that is fed to the controller.
The observations (yi) are forwarded to the central system containing estimator and detector
at a regular time interval denoted by ∆t. At each time step ∆t, the estimator of the system
generates estimated readings based on the reading of previous time step. These readings are
used by the detector to detect the difference between the newly observed sensor readings
and estimated readings.
7.3.1 The Kalman Filter
To apply the Kalman Filter technique, the observation equation for the above system
can be written as:
yk = Cxk + νk (7.25)
Here, yk = [y
k
1 , ...., y
k
m]
T ∈ Rm is measurement vector collected from the sensors and yki is
the measurement generated by sensor i at time k. vk is the measurement noise and assumed
to be white Gaussian noise, which is independent of initial conditions and process noise.
Kalman filter can then be applied to compute state estimations xˆk using observations
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yk.
7.3.2 Attack/Failure Detection
Since it is assumed that the noises in the system is Gaussian, we use χ2 detector to
compute the difference between the observed value from the sensors and the estimated values
from the Kalman Filter as the following [14]:
The residue zk+1 at time k + 1 is defined as:
zk+1
∆
= yk+1 − yˆk+1|k
equivalently,
zk+1
∆
= yk+1 − C(Axˆk + Buk) (7.26)
gk = z
T
k Pzk (7.27)
where P is the covariance matrix of zk, the residue. The χ2 detector compares gk with a
certain threshold to detect a failure or attack and triggers the alarm for potential attack or
failure.
gk > threshold, (7.28)
where gk is defined as:
gk = g(zk, yk, xˆk, ......, zk−τ+1, yk−τ+1, xˆk−τ+1) (7.29)
The function g is continuous and τ ∈ N is the window size of the detector [14].
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7.4 Attacks and Defenses
Without loss of generality, we use level and velocity sensors in this work to design the
framework. However, it must be noted that the framework is valid when any other types of
sensors are used in the WSS. Without limiting ourselves to just level and velocity sensors, in
this section, we list various attack/fault models that can be defended using the framework
designed above.
1. WSS fault: Any system fault that can be detected by the sensors of the WSS, for
example, water leakage, unintentional addition of contamination, will alert the detector
and the alarm will be triggered.
2. Naive attack on the system: If the attacker simply adds contaminants to the water
or steals water from the WSS, the sensors will report it to the central system. The
detector will detect it immediately as the difference between estimated and actual
observation will be large and will trigger the alarm.
3. Physical damage to the sensors: When the sensors are damaged physically, no mea-
surements are obtained causing the system to detect it immediately. As in case of
naive attack, the estimated reading will be different from the actual reading and will
cause the alarm to trigger.
4. Random data injection: Let us assume that the attacker has control over some sensors
and feeds some random values to mislead the system. As these randomly generated
sequences will not correspond to the estimates generated by the Kalman Filter, the
detector will detect the difference and report the attack.
7.5 Injection of False Data into the System
The attacks discussed above do not take statistical attack into account. The authors of
[14] proposed False Data Injection attack that uses statistical analysis and has proved that a
system with the Kalman Filter estimator can be attacked by generating an attack sequence
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yak . It is assumed that the attacker knows the matrices A,B,C,Q,R of the system along
with observation gain K. The attack sequence changes the measurements obtained from the
sensors to:
y′k = Cx
′
k + vk + Γy
a
k (7.30)
where Γ = diag(γ1, .....γm) is the sensor selection matrix. γi is a binary variable whose value
is 1 if the sensor i has been compromised, 0 otherwise. yak is the input from the attacker.
y′k and x
′
k denote the partially compromised system and are different from the original non-
tampered values. Then the system dynamics changes as following:
x′(k + 1) = Ax′(k) + Bu′(k) + w(k)
y′k = Cx
′
k + νk + Γy
a
k (7.31)
xˆ′k+1 = xˆ
′
k + Bu
′
k +Kk[y
′
k+1 − C(Axˆ′k + Bu′k)]
The new residue and estimation error can be defined as
z′k+1 = y
′
K+1 − C(Axˆ′k + Bu′k)
e′k = x
′
k − xˆ′k (7.32)
Also, the new error detection function can be defined as
g′k = g(z
′
k, y
′
k, xˆ
′
k, ......, z
′
k−τ+1, y
′
k−τ+1, xˆ
′
k−τ+1) (7.33)
The alarm will be triggered when
g′k > threshold (7.34)
As stated in [14], if the attacker simply injects a large yak , the residue z
′
k will be large
as well resulting in attack detection by the detector. However, if the vector xˆ′k, y
′
k, z
′
k, has
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the same statistical properties in the partially compromised system as those of the healthy
system, then the attack can be successful.
The algebraic condition to identify perfectly attackable systems is presented in [14]. As
stated in the paper, the system described above is perfectly attackable iff A has an unstable
eigenvalue and the corresponding eigenvector v satisfies the following conditions:
1. Cv ∈ span(Γ), where span(Γ) is the column span of Γ
2. v is the reachable state of dynamic system ek+1 = (A−KCA)ek −KΓyak+1
Using the results from [14], the attack sequence can be generate using the following
equation:
yan+i = y
a
i −
λi+1
M
y∗, i = 0, 1, 2, ..... (7.35)
where, |λ| ≥ 1 and Cv ∈ span(Γ). There exists y∗ such that Γy∗ = Cv and M = max
||∆zk||. Following equation (7.35), the attacker can generate an attack sequence based on
eigen decomposition of matrix A and matrix Γ.
7.5.1 Defense Against Data Injection Attack
As proposed in [14], the eigen decomposition could also be performed at the defender
side on matrix A to find all the unstable eigenvector v to compute Cv. For each Cv, the
1’s will indicate the compromised sensors needed by the attacker to perform a successful
attack along direction v. Therefore, the defender can defend the system by deploying more
redundant sensors along the direction of attack.
Another powerful defense mechanism is to implement the data encryption algorithms.
The data from sensors to the estimator can be encrypted using either symmetric key or
asymmetric key. The key can be periodically exchanged between the sensors and the central
system which will make data injection more difficult.
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7.5.2 Case Study
Using the Water Supply model and attack model described in sections above, a more
comprehensive illustration is provided here. For the sake of simplicity, one water level sensor
and one drifter is considered. Let the dimension of the state space be n = 2. Then, from
equation (7.24) and (7.25) and assuming ∆t = 1 , we get:
Xk+1 =

 1 + βi2 αi2
ηi
2
1 + γi
2

Xk + wk
where, Xk =

 hk
vk


Also,
yk = Xk + νk (7.36)
Considering the above system and substituting Manning’s Coefficient m = 0.025, the
matrix A will be: A =

 1 0
0 1.006

 and value of K will be: K =

 0.618 0
0 0.6193


The eigenvector for the system with level sensor compromised will be [0, 1]T and with
n = 2 the attack sequence can be designed to be:
ya2+i = y
a
i −
λi+1
M
y∗, (7.37)
where i = 1,2,3,... and λ <= 1 and M <= 1
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PART 8
TOWARDS THE SECURED CPS: A CASE STUDY ON ANONYMITY OF
MOBILITYFIRST NETWORKING
With more and more mobile/static devices being connected to the current internet, the
existing networking infrastructure may not be sufficient to handle these devices in future.
With that in mind, researchers are studying possible network architectures for future internet.
Further, since network infrastructure is an integral part of any CPS, it is important to secure
the underlying network to build a secure CPS. Hence, in this chapter, we study anonymity
and security of the nodes in the MobilityFirst future internet architecture.
8.1 Security in MF network overview
With the ever increasing demands of mobile and networking enabled devices, much
recent research is conducted to incorporate these devices into a delay-tolerant, scalable,
evolvable, secure, trustworthy and context aware architecture that can provide seamless
mobility in future Internet. MobilityFirst (MF) network [7] is an architecture designed to
facilitate the mobile as well as non-mobile devices in future Internet. MF Network uses
Globally Unique Flat Identifiers (GUIDs) which are public key based self-certifying flat
identifiers assigned to the devices in the network in order to provide strong authentication
and security. As these GUIDs are flat, the identity of a device in MF Network is disassociated
from its network location. Hence, when a device in MF Network moves from one network
to another, its GUID remains the same whereas its network address (NA) changes. In other
words, GUIDs are dynamically bound to routable network addresses using the Global Name
Resolution Service (GNRS). GNRS employs a Direct Mapping scheme (DMap) to map the
GUIDs to NA. DMap applies k hashing functions to produce a list of k network addresses and
stores the GUID to NA mapping in the Autonomous Systems (ASs) that own these network
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addresses [73] such that the mappings from GUID to NAs are proportionally distributed
among ASs. This technique allows the hosting ASs to be derived locally from the identifier
by any network entity.
Certain level of privacy is embedded in the MF network architecture owing to the fact
that the GUIDs are separated from NAs. GUIDs are flat identifiers and do not disclose any
location information. Nevertheless, GUIDs are long term, persistent identifiers of network
identities, they can be easily exploited to track the end users. To overcome this problem,
disposable GUIDs [74] can be used. However, disposable GUIDs are still mapped on to the
NAs and these NAs give away coarse location information. Thus, varying the GUID can not
provide the users with complete protection, as the users may have the same NA. In fact,
the issues on anonymity and privacy in MF Network are wide open. The literature schemes
(such as the ones described in Section II) are proposed for traditional Internet and cannot
be directly applied to MF Network because MF Network does not use the same naming
techniques and architectures as the traditional network. Hence, to provide anonymity and
privacy to the users, it is necessary to make sure that the adversaries cannot eavesdrop and
decode the information such as source, destination and the routing path of the packet.
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Figure (8.1) Virtual network topology in AMF
Sensitive user information can be collected by adversaries spying on the Internet con-
nection. User location, websites visited, personal information etc. can be identified by doing
active/passive network analysis in current Internet. To mitigate such privacy compromis-
ing in traditional Internet, much literature research has been conducted. For example, the
studies in [75], [76], [77], [78], [79] suggest to use the cryptography and anonymous routing
protocols to create a secure layer over the Internet to provide anonymity to the end users.
Similarly, the use of pseudonyms and a trusted central server is investigated in [80], [81],
[82], [83], [84], [85]. The work in [76] develops cryptography and secret sharing to provide
identity anonymity, location anonymity, data and traffic anonymity in traditional network.
The study in [77] proposes to integrate authenticated key exchange mechanism into the
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routing algorithm to provide some anonymity. In [78] anonymous routing protocol that can
preform MAC-layer and network-layer communications is discussed. The authors in [80] use
the privacy-tag to hide actual location revealing address in case of mobile devices. The work
in [81] provides anonymity by changing pseudonym using a trusted third party server and
the effectiveness of frequently changing pseudonyms in case of vehicular network is discussed
in [82]. The authors in [86] have proposed to use anonymity zone to provide anonymity to
the source and the destination. Based on the onion routing technique, Tor is a practical
tool that provides users with privacy and prevents traffic analysis in Internet [75]. However,
as mentioned earlier, these literature schemes cannot take advantage of GUID and GNRS
in MF Network and cannot directly be applied to MF Network due to the differences in
architecture and naming schemes. Furthermore, in the case of Tor, it maintains a list of
nodes that participate in the routing process and if adversaries can control many routers in
the limited list, they may collude to decrypt the route exposing the end users
To overcome such vulnerability, the Anonymity in MobilityFirst (AMF) scheme utilizes
the available GUID and GNRS services provided by the MF Network architecture along with
intelligent key exchanges among the different tiers to setup a secure path between the two
end users. The basic idea of AMF is shown in Figure 8.1, where the source sets up a route
using three tiers of routers to connect to the destination. As to be elaborated in Section 8.2
and 8.3, Tier I has three random routers that can identify source and Tier II routers but
are unaware of each other. Tier II also has three random routers that are unaware of each
other and can identify Tier I routers and Tier III router. Tier III has one router which can
identify Tier II routers and the destination router. Using the same hashing technique as in
the case of identification of hosting ASs, the routers in the next tier are derived locally and
route establishment proceeds only if all these multiple routers generate the same GUIDs as
next tier routers.
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Figure (8.2) AMF Anonymity Architecture
8.2 System Model
Figure 8.1 shows the virtual connection topology of the AMF scheme. AMF maintains a
list of available routers with their public keys. When data is to be transferred across the two
users, it selects three routers and encrypts the data into three layers using the public keys of
the routers selected. The encrypted data is then transmitted across the network. Three tiers
are selected to ensure that the routers only have the knowledge of their immediate neighbors.
In other words, the first tier only knows the source and not the destination, the third tier
only knows the destination and not the source. The middle or second tier is used as the
buffer between the first and the third tier. The first and second tiers have three random
routers each. Three routers in these tiers are selected to ensure that they cannot collude to
identify second and third tier routers without performing any GNRS query or work together
to identify the source and the destination. The third tier has only one router since it does
not need to identify any following tiers. These routers are identified in a random fashion
and picked from the available pool of routers in the network which minimizes the chances
of collusion between these selected routers thus removing the issues caused by trusting any
node in the system. Specifically, the existing GNRS feature in MF Network architecture is
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used and the techniques similar to generating k NAs using hashing function while storing
the GUID to NA mapping can be used to identify multiple routers in each tier. Note that
the router that performs the GNRS lookup will know the GUID of the network node that
initiated the GNRS request and vice-versa. Thus, we cannot use this method for generating
GUIDs for all three tiers as in the case of Tor [75]. The encrypted data is then transmitted
across the network. Each router in the three tiers, upon receiving the packet, decrypts it
and generates the address of next router and forwards it while providing the anonymity for
the end users.
8.3 Anonymity in MobilityFirst (AMF)
Figure 8.2 presents the tiered AMF anonymity architecture in detail. To establish an
anonymous session, the source starts by generating four random GUIDs, the first three are
used to query GNRS to get three routers in the first tier. The fourth GUID serving as Key A
is distributed to all Tier I routers. These routers hash the key four times to get four random
GUIDs. The first three of them are used to obtain Tier II routers and the fourth random
GUID is used as Key B. XORed Key B (each three routers in Tier II has its own XORed
version of Key B) is distributed to Tier II routers. Tier II routers use XORed GUIDs of
Tier I routers to obtain Key C. The Key C is hashed to get a single Tier III router. Tier
III router performs XOR on different versions Key B obtained from Tier II routers to get
the original Key B. After Key B is revealed to Tier III router, Tier III router generates a
random session key, encrypts it with Key B and distributes it to all three Tier II routers.
Tier II routers encrypt it again using Key C and transfer it to all three Tier I routers. Since
Tier I routers do not have Key C, they will transfer the key to the source. As the source
can generate both Key B by hashing Key A and Key C by XORing the Tier I GUIDs, the
source will decrypt the session key to establish the session to connect with the destination.
The following sub-sections describe how each tiers are generated and how they talk with
each other in detail.
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8.3.1 Client to Tier I
The client requesting anonymous connection initiates the communication by identifying
the first tier routers. On one hand, choosing only two routers for the first tier will not
help in identifying the misbehaving router that generates next tier router without following
the protocol. On the other hand, choosing four or more routers unnecessarily complicate
the scheme. Hence, we choose three routers such that if a router misbehaves and generates
GUIDs that are not same as the other two, it can be identified. The client generates four
GUID-length random strings of data and then feeds three of these strings into GNRS, from
which the client (or source) gets three replies. The three routers that respond are identified
by the client as Tier I routers. The fourth random string generated is Key A. This key is
used as the seed to generate Tier II routers by Tier I routers. It must be noted that the
routers in Tier I do not recognize each other and only communicate with client at this time.
8.3.2 Tier I to Tier II
After the establishment of route between client and Tier I routers, client sends Key A
to the three Tier I routers. Each Tier I router hashes Key A for a set number of times to
generate four more GUID-length strings. Again, following the same procedure as in the case
of identifying Tier I routers by the client, the Tier I routers use GNRS to convert the first
three hashed strings into GUIDs, thus generating the three Tier II addresses. The fourth
random string generated by Tier I is Key B. Note that the client also knows Key A and
can perform the same hash function to generate the four random strings including Key B.
However, the client will refrain from performing the GUID lookups itself because Tier II
routers should not know the identity of the client node. If only one Tier I router is used,
the router could contact another router to collude with instead of performing GNRS lookup.
Hence, it is important to have multiple (>= 3) Tier I routers. The route establishment can
proceed only if all the three Tier I routers generate the same Tier II routers. And all Tier
II routers must hear from all Tier I routers for the route setup. Key B is transferred from
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the Tier I routers to the Tier II routers after XORing it with the GUIDs of the other Tier
II routers. Since Key B is a randomly generated data and the Tier II routers are unaware
of GUIDs of the source, destination and other Tier II routers, it is impossible for a Tier II
router to derive the Key from the XORed GUIDs.
8.3.3 Tier II to Tier III
As discussed in the above sections, the Tier II routers have GUIDs of all the Tier I
routers, thus Key C can be generated by XORing all of the GUIDs of Tier I routers. The
XOR operation is commutative hence the order of XORing is irrelevant. Note that the
original client can also generate Key C by XORing the GUIDs of Tier I routers. Key C
is then hashed and fed through GNRS to obtain the GUID of the Tier III router. In the
mean time, the Tier II routers transfer the XORed copies of the Key B to Tier III router,
originally obtained by Tier II routers from Tier I routers. As can be seen in Equation (8.1),
by XORing all of the XORed copies of Key B together, the Key B is revealed to the Tier II
router.
(Key B ⊕ GUID5 ⊕GUID6)
⊕
(Key B ⊕ GUID4 ⊕GUID6)
⊕
(Key B ⊕ GUID4 ⊕GUID5)
= Key B
(8.1)
8.3.4 Route Establishment
For the encrypted route establishment, a random session key is selected by the Tier III
router. This session key is then encrypted with Key B and transmitted to Tier II routers.
Which is then encrypted by Tier II routers using Key C and transmitted to Tier I routers.
Although, Tier I routers know Key B, they cannot decrypt the session key as it is further
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encrypted using Key C. Hence the session key is securely encrypted and transmitted to the
original client. Finally, the client has both the keys: Key B and Key C, and is able to decode
to reveal the session key. It must be noted that the client receives three encrypted copies
of the session key and the route establishment will complete only if all three copies are the
same. This assures that the session key was encrypted as required by the scheme. Once the
session key is obtained, the client can randomly choose one of the Tier I routers and this
router can randomly choose one of the Tier II router to setup the path along which the data
traffic is routed. By employing the concept of disposable GUID, the session keys can also be
changed frequently to prevent a single compromised key from revealing the contents of the
entire conversation to further enhance the anonymity.
8.3.5 The Stepwise Procedure in AMF
The stepwise route establishment process, as described in Figure 8.3, is further elabo-
rated in the steps below.
• Step 1: The client (or source) generates four random GUID length strings and chooses
one of them to be Key A. The GNRS query using the remaining GUIDs allows the client
to obtain GUIDs of three Tier I routers, which further enable the client to establish a
connection with these three routers and transfer Key A.
• Step 2: In Tier I routers, Key A is hashed four times to get three random GUIDs and
Key B. The GNRS query using the first three random GUIDs allows Tier I routers to
obtain three Tier II GUIDs, which enable Tier I routers to establish connections with
Tier II routers. To each router in Tier II, Tier I routers transfer Key B XORed with
the GUIDs of the two remaining Tier II routers.
• Step 3: In Tier II routers, Key C is generated by XORing all 3 GUIDS of Tier I
routers. Through hashing Key C and querying GNRS to get GUID of Tier III router,
a connection with Tier III router can be established. Tier II routers then forward
XORed Key B from Tier I routers to Tier III router without altering it.
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• Step 4: In Tier III router, XOR operation is performed on all keys obtained from Tier
II routers to get Key B. A random Session Key is generated and encrypted with Key
B, which is then transmitted to Tier II routers.
• Step 5: Tier II routers encrypt the obtained session key using Key C and transmit it
to Tier I routers.
• Step 6: Tier I routers transmit the key as it is to the Client.
• Step 7: The client (or source) obtains Key B by hashing Key A and obtains Key C by
XORing the GUIDs of the Tier I routers. Now the client can use these keys to decrypt
the session key and establish an anonymous connection with the destination using this
session key.
8.4 Analysis
In order to ensure privacy and anonymity of the users, there should not be any data
leakage between or amongst router layers. It is also very important to ensure that the GUIDs
of routers in Tier I and Tier II are not exposed within the same layer. For example, if Tier
II routers can identify each other, Key B can be decrypted and used to hijack the session.
Thus, GUIDs of routers in the same layers should never be leaked between the routers in
the same tier. Similarly, the random keys were used as the seed to deterministically derive
GUIDs. It must ensured that the routers are unable to backtrack the hashes to obtain the
key used as the seed. Once the seed is obtained, it can follow the same hashing technique
to identify the participating routers in any layer and use it to hijack the session. However,
since the order in which the Tier I routers pick the Tier II routers is not known to the Tier
II routers only one of the three routers will be able to backtrack the seed. The route setup
is a one-time process. Once the route is set up and the session keys are exchanged, the data
communication can be preformed as in the case of normal Internet traffic. This implies the
complexity of the scheme is defined by the complexity of the path setup procedure. In the
scheme presented in this chapter, the client performs 4 hashes to generate 3 GUIDs and a
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seed for the Tier I routers. Three GUID lookups are performed in parallel and as stated
in [73], the total lookups take around 83ms 95% of the time. Once the Tier I routers are
identified, the source transmits Key A to these routers. Tier I routers similarly perform 4
hashes (one of them is Key B) and 3 GUID lookups. Finally the Tier II routers generate the
third GUID by performing XOR operation over the GUIDs of the Tier I routers and perform
a GUID lookup. The Tier III router then generates the session key and encrypts the session
key using Key B, which is further encrypted using Key C at Tier II and transferred all the
way back to the client (or the source). The client can get the session key after decryption.
Thus, the scheme requires at least 15 encryption, decryption and hashing functions and 7
GUID lookups to set up the routing path.
8.4.1 Comparison with Tor
In our scheme, the traffic is encrypted twice: using the GUID of the intermediate
router and using the GUID of the final destination. In both cases, the routers only know
their immediate neighbors. However, with Tor [75], the traffic is encrypted by the client
three times, which is decrypted by the routers one after another and sent to the next hop.
In addition, routers do not generally know which tier they belong to unless the last hop
receives the plain text, in which case it is the third tier. In the AMF scheme each router,
while unaware of the other routers in each tier, is aware of which tier it belongs to. Thus,
Tier I routers are certain that they are talking to the client, but still unaware of who the
destination is. A major advantage of the AMF scheme is that, the routers in different tiers
are identified from a large number of routers in the Internet thus reducing the chance of
collusion amongst routers in different tiers. However, the list of nodes participating in route
establishment in Tor could be small and the adversaries may be able to take advantage by
committing many nodes to this list.
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8.4.2 An Illustrated Example
Figure 8.4 shows a snapshot of how the route is setup and communication is started
between Alice’s device A1 and Bob’s device B2. A1 first queries GNRS to obtain the GUIDs
of three routers in the MF Network. As described in Figure 8.3, the route is established
between the routers within the network and an encrypted session key is returned to Alice.
Alice encrypts the message to Bob once using Bob’s public key and again with the session
key before transmitting it through the network using the selected route. The last Tier router
in the network decrypts the message using session key and transfers it to Bob. Bob then,
decrypts the message with his private key. As one can see that, the anonymity and privacy
of the conversation between Alice and Bob can be preserved since eavesdropping and traffic
analysis cannot occur along the routing path.
Figure (8.4) An AMF Example showing communication between Alice and Bob
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Figure (8.3) Stepwise description of AMF showing the key exchange and route establishment
process
86
PART 9
CONCLUSIONS
A framework for smart grid system using Kalman Filter estimator together with the χ2-
detector and Euclidean detector has been designed. It has been shown that the χ2-detector is
efficient in detecting different types of faults and attacks like DoS attack and random attacks
on the system. Further, to handle attacks on the system like False Data Injection which
evades χ2-detector, we have proposed Euclidean detector which uses Euclidean distance
metric for detection. We have also shown that the false positives due to noise for the
Euclidean detector can be reduced to less than 1% with the proper selection of the threshold.
Our extensive simulation and analysis have demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed
Euclidean detector in detecting various types of attacks including the False Data Injection
attack.
Two schemes using Kalman Filter and χ2-detector have been proposed for attack/fault
isolation. The first scheme uses the Generalized Observer Scheme (GOS) to identify a single
sensor under attack or at fault. To identify attacks/faults on multiple sensor nodes, we pro-
posed an Iterative Observe Scheme (IOS). IOS implements KF observers to identify the area
under attack by splitting the set of sensors into subsets whenever the residue function exceeds
the threshold. Our preliminary study shows, the IOS scheme requires 2m− 1 computations
in the worst case and 2logm − 1 computations in the best case, where m is the number of
measurements in the system. GOS scheme requires m computations in both cases.
In order to be able to track malicious users in a smart grid monitoring energy con-
sumption and fluctuations can be effective. Thus, in this dissertation scheduling and control
of appliances including Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC), Electric Vehi-
cle (EV), and deferrable load such as washer/dryer, batch printer/photocopier machine have
been studied. Given the temperature and price forecasts, a Linear Programming (LP) model
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for the system is derived to maximize the user comfort. An iterative algorithm, namely, Com-
fort Prioritizing Greedy (CPG) was presented and compared with the bin-packing algorithm.
It was shown that the proposed CPG algorithm can be effectively used to schedule the Home
Energy Management (HEM) system.
Similalry, for the water supply system, a framework for attack/fault detection has been
designed which is derived mathematically using the Saint-Venant equations for the shallow
water systems. The Kalman Filter is then applied to these equations to obtain the state
estimations for the WSS. The estimations obtained from the Kalman filter along with the
actual observations are fed to a χ2 detector and the difference between the two readings is
compared with a given threshold. The detector is designed to trigger an alarm when the
difference is greater than the threshold, hence detecting attacks or faults in the WSS. We
have demonstrated various attacks can be detected by the framework. Furthermore, we have
addressed a statistical attack model that could bypass the detection scheme and discussed
possible defences against such an intelligent attack.
Finally, a scheme, namely, Anonymity in MobilityFirst (AMF), has been proposed to
ensure anonymity in the future internet architecture. The AMF scheme employs a tiered
approach while taking advantage of the core features offered by MobilityFirst Network to
set up anonymous routing path and encrypted traffic delivery. It has been shown that with
intelligent exchange of keys between different tiers of routers, user privacy in the MoblityFirst
Network can be achieved without much overhead, which suggests that the proposed AMF
can be included as a core service in MF Network.
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